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W M D T e r r o r i s m : N o L o n g e r 
a Q u e s t i o n o f I f f b u t W h e n ? 
G a v i n C a m e r o n 
The death and destruction inflicted on 9/11 aboard the four hijacked 
airliners and in New York City and Washington D.C. was unprec-
edented in the history of terrorism. In comparison, prior to 9/11, 
the most destructive act of terrorism in terms of human lives lost was the 
1985 Air India bombing. Without seeking to minimize the extent of those 
losses, fatalities from that earlier incident were 328,1 or roughly one-
tenth of the 3000 fatalities experienced in the 2001 attacks. Following 
that slaughter, the world was confronted by increasing evidence that al-
Qa'ida, the group responsible for 9/11, had also made considerable 
efforts to acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
weapons with which to perpetuate their campaign. These acquisition 
attempts appear to be continuing still, and throughout 2002 additional 
proof became evident of such efforts, and also of numerous plots to use 
CBRN weapons against Western targets in both North America and 
Europe. Al-Qa'ida's campaign represents the most concerted effort to 
acquire, weaponize, and use such materials since Aum Shinrikyo's in the 
early and mid-1990s. Concern over the potential use of CBRN weapons 
in a WMD attack has become the ultimate nightmare scenario for 
government officials. Speaking in November 2002, Prime Minister Tony 
Blair of Great Britain stated: "terrorism and WMD have the potential, at 
least, to be directly linked. Would al-Qa'ida buy WMD if it could? 
Certainly. Do they have the financial resources? Probably. Would they 
use them? Definitely." 2 Given al-Qa'ida's willingness to inflict mass 
casualties in addition to their financial depth, organizational strengths, 
contacts, and motivation to acquire CBRN weapons, this paper considers 
whether the terrorist use of such weapons has become inevitable, or is 
the product of overreaction in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. 
Particulars of First Publication: 
2004. After 9111: Terrorism and Crime in a Globalised World, D. Charters 
and G. Walker, eds. (St. John, NB: Centre for Conflict Studies/Centre for 
Foreign Policy Studies), 85-112. 
WMD TERRORISM: NO LONGER A QUESTION OF IF, BUT WHEN? 
Before addressing this, it is necessary to clarify one definitional 
issue. For the purposes of this article, Weapons of Mass Destruction 
will mean not only chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
weapons, but also "massive" conventional weapons. The reason for 
such a distinction is obvious in the wake of the 9/11 attacks: mass 
destruction and mass casualties can be inflicted with conventional 
weapons just as effectively as with CBRN weapons. Conversely, the 
majority of sub-state or "multi-centric" uses of CBRN weapons by 
terrorists have occurred at very localized and small-scale levels. To 
describe such events as examples of WMD use, which implies a scale 
of enormity in devastation, is not only illogical but also analytically 
problematic. WMD and CBRN are not synonymous. For the purposes 
of this article, incidents involving CBRN materials serve as a "type" of 
attack rather than as a "scale" of attack, and thus the terrorist use of 
CBRN will include both low- and high-level weapons. 
In order to address whether WMD terrorism, meaning devastation 
on a scale similar to 11 September, has become inevitable, this article 
initially considers the indicators from al-Qa'ida's attacks on 9/11, noting 
in particular that it was an assault that utilized a variety of traditional 
terrorist tactics, rather than the much feared CBRN materials. The 
ramifications of 9/11 for the future of al-Qa'ida and other terrorist 
groups are then considered by evaluating the past terrorist employment 
of CBRN weapons. While continuing attempts at CBRN acquisition by 
al-Qa'ida and others offers a considerable threat that absolutely must be 
addressed because of the nature of CBRN weapons, and while future 
acts of high casualty or mass destructive terrorism are certainly 
possible, the evidence available indicates that conventional weapons 
remain the most plausible means to inflict WMD attacks. 
TERRORISM AND WMD 
The 11 September terrorists used two "traditional" terrorist tactics in 
perpetuating their attacks: hijacking, and crashing a vehicle into a 
building. Their innovation was to combine these tactics and to use 
planes rather than trucks as the delivery vehicle. In doing so, the 11 
September terrorists killed some 3,000 people using nothing more 
exotic than conventional weapons. By comparison, the most notable 
terrorist use of CBRN weapons, Aum Shinrikyo's March 1995 attack on 
the Tokyo subway, killed twelve people and injured thousands. This 
may suggest that 9/11 is indicative of further acts of "high-casualty 
terrorism," rather than of terrorism with CBRN weapons. The two 
types of attack and their means are not synonymous. Despite the 
attempts to acquire CBRN weapons by groups such as Aum Shinrikyo 
and al-Qa'ida and the actual use of such weapons by several other 
groups, no terrorist organization has perpetrated a WMD high 
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casualty incident using CBRN weapons. If fatalities are the key factor 
in defining a terrorist incident as "mass-destructive," then we have yet 
to see a clear-cut example involving non-conventional weapons. When 
terrorist groups seek to cause high levels of casualties, they trad-
itionally do so using conventional weapons such as explosives. The 
threat from high-end CBRN terrorism has arisen because groups such 
as al-Qa'ida seek such weapons not only for their potential destructive 
power, per se, but because of the status and symbolism possessing and 
using such weapons would bring to the group (who are increasingly 
apocalyptic in nature). 
In addition, the 9/11 attacks certainly revealed al-Qa'ida's 
organizational abilities and the group's willingness to commit attacks 
that resulted in mass casualties. In that respect, the attacks of 11 
September were unprecedented, causing numbers of casualties that 
exceeded any previous terrorist attack by several orders of magnitude. 
The political and social effect of the attacks could scarcely have been 
greater if the group had used a CBRN weapon such as a "nuke." While 
the attacks had a variety of motivations, one of those was certainly 
symbolic: to strike the United States at its military and economic 
centres in full view of the world's media. The attacks of 11 September 
against the Pentagon and particularly against the World Trade Center 
towers has undoubtedly raised the bar in achieving "shock and awe" 
for future terrorists. It is now exceptionally more difficult for other 
groups to match al-Qa'ida's impact, and groups that regard themselves 
as rivals to al-Qa'ida for attention, leverage, or resources may believe 
themselves compelled to consider alternative strategies for their 
campaigns: possibly employing new and more terrifying types of 
weaponry This dynamic of "one-upmanship" ironically occurs when 
the 11 September attacks have created an unprecedented, worldwide 
backlash against terrorism of any sort whatsoever. It is likely to be 
increasingly difficult, at least in the short term, for groups to find 
overtly sympathetic sponsors of significant means because of this 
backlash. In such circumstances, groups may find themselves resorting 
to one of two opposing strategies: a "quietist" approach where terrorist 
violence is temporarily minimized (although criminal activity to 
generate funding will certainly continue unabated), or a campaign of 
more extreme coercion where new types of weapon and levels of 
violence are perpetuated. 
However, terrorism as a behaviour or strategy cannot be viewed 
as a linear process. The most obvious proof of this is the aftermath of 
Aum Shinrikyo's 1995 sarin attack in Tokyo. Although not the first use 
of a chemical or biological weapon by a terrorist group, Aum's attack 
seemed different, using a high-end agent to cause indiscriminate 
casualties. So disturbing was the Tokyo attack that most analysts and 
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those charged with countering terrorism assumed that Aum's attack 
represented a harbinger of the future; that other, increasingly lethal 
attacks with CBRN weapons would follow, putting terrorism on an 
escalatory spiral of scale and scope. Such assessments, however, were 
not supported by the experience of the following years, as no wave of 
similar attempts manifested anywhere in the world, particularly now 
that authorities were ready for the previously unthinkable. This in spite 
of the increasing "know-how" regarding CBRN weapons and the 
availability of "weapons-usable technologies" from a range of sources.3 
Moreover, the increasing fear and "terror" of such attacks on the part 
of officials in many countries, that terrorists might use these 
apocalyptic weapons, increased the coercive power available to any 
terrorist group willing and able to make a convincing threat about 
using CBRN weapons, and thus encourage their pursuit. 
Interestingly, and refuting the idea of a linear path of development, 
al-Qa'ida's 11 September attacks, far from relying on CBRN weapons, 
used a technologically conservative weapon and depended on variants 
of familiar tactics: hijacking and vehicle bombing. Although al-Qa'ida 
was and remains undoubtedly interested in the full range of CBRN 
weapons, and clearly investigated each for their potential value in 
committing an attack, the organization ultimately chose a different route 
from the one implied by Aum's 1995 attack. The precise reason for this 
tactical choice is not entirely certain, but it seems likely that al-Qa'ida 
decided to use methods that were well tested and reliable over the more 
uncertain and complicated use of CBRN. Although CBRN weapons have 
supposedly grown increasingly accessible in the past ten years, 
according to the "tabloid" doomsday scenarios, there remain major 
challenges in successfully acquiring, weaponizing, and delivering an 
effective CBRN weapon. While the wealth, resources, and contacts of an 
organization such as al-Qa'ida would have helped to reduce this 
complication, the example of Aum Shinrikyo, also wealthy and well 
connected but unable to deliver a significant or large-scale attack with 
chemical or biological weapons, shows that considerable problems still 
exist with this choice. Al-Qa'ida therefore, appears to have chosen a 
method that, in addition to being cheaper and technologically less 
sophisticated, also had a better probability of causing WMD-scale 
casualties than an attack using CBRN weapons.4 
The central question then becomes what, if anything, changed on 
11 September with respect to the likelihood of CBRN terrorism? There 
are two conclusions to be drawn from the attacks of 11 September and 
its aftermath; both should have been evident before then, but both now 
have a clear bearing on al-Qa'ida's future operations. First, and most 
obviously, al-Qa'ida is willing to inflict high levels of casualties on a 
WMD-scale, and second, the organization has a long-standing and 
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active interest in CBRN weapons. Although the attacks of 11 
September were unprecedented as terrorist incidents because the 
number of fatalities exceeded any previous attack by several orders of 
magnitude, the willingness of many terrorist groups to use high levels 
of violence has been clear for years and is not new. Several such attacks 
against the United States, Israel, the West, and "corrupt" Islamic 
regimes were intended to result in heavy casualties, or actually did so. 
Ramzi Yousefs attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 is one such 
example; others include the destruction of American military facilities 
in Saudi Arabia in the mid-1990s, and the 1998 East African Embassy 
bombings. Ahmed Ressam's plot to attack Los Angeles International 
Airport around the millennium is an example of a similarly destructive 
plot, although one of the few we know about that was intercepted. 
Such a trend of high-casualty incidents or attempts to cause high-
casualty events supports the supposition that al-Qa'ida or its 
associated groups would be willing to use any means, including CBRN 
weapons if possible, to create mass destruction or casualties. Such a 
supposition is credible because information captured in the aftermath 
of operations in Afghanistan from al-Qa'ida training camps confirmed 
the organization has a long-standing interest in CBRN weapons. Due 
to their accessibility, officials cannot afford to doubt that al-Qa'ida 
sought and continues to seek such weaponry. In late May 2002, United 
States Secretary of State Colin Powell, speaking in general about 
terrorist groups, said that he believed that "groups are trying every 
way they can to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction, 
whether radiological, chemical, biological, or nuclear." 5 Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he believed it "inevitable" that 
terrorists would acquire weapons of mass destruction, and that "they 
would not hesitate one minute to use them."6 
Obviously, al-Qa'ida is not the only group to either seek or 
attempt to use CBRN. An ominous, small-scale type of attack occurred 
shortly after 11 September, when America was confronted by an 
anthrax attack via the posting of contaminated letters through the 
United States mail; five people died from anthrax inhalation and a 
further eighteen were infected. Although there have been hundreds of 
isolated incidents in the United States since 1998 involving threats or 
hoaxes of packages containing anthrax, these attacks were the first 
actual use of the pathogen. More worrisome still, the anthrax had been 
expertly milled to a fine powder and processed with great 
sophistication with chemical additives to make them more readily 
airborne and easily inhaled into the lungs of victims. This suggests that 
the perpetrators had access to specialized knowledge and technology 
relating to the weaponization of anthrax. It is even plausible, as no one 
has yet been apprehended for the attack, that the perpetrators may 
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have acquired a small quantity of the powder on the black market.8 A 
distressing alternative scenario is that the still unidentified 
perpetrators have developed the means of manufacturing high-quality 
anthrax as a dried powder and could therefore launch further, possibly 
more widespread or more effectively delivered, attacks against the 
millions of people who rely on the United States postal service.9 Thus, 
while a WMD attack may shock and cause despair, even the potential 
for a CBRN attack causes terror. 
Although these attacks were small-scale, they were indicative of 
an extremely troubling potential for further large-scale action and the 
inducement of literal, widespread terror. The letters accompanying the 
anthrax warned that an attack had occurred and stated the agent 
involved to induce panic and reaction.10 The primary intention of the 
attacks, therefore, was not mass casualties like the 9/11 al-Qa'ida 
attacks, but to cause fear and disruption; an objective in which they 
were successful. Moreover, the attacks had a significant economic, but 
especially psychological, impact on American society, and as with 
government officials after 1995, it is that power through fear which 
may encourage other unrelated groups to identify CBRN agents as the 
best means of attaining their goals.11 The attacks were particularly 
effective psychologically, coming, as they did, so soon after the 
immensely traumatic attacks of 11 September, and the possibility of 
further high-casualty terrorism could have provided considerable 
political leverage. The violence was indiscriminate and gruesome as 
the letters affected not only the intended recipient but anyone - a 
researcher responsible for opening mail or a postal worker - who 
simply handled the letter in transit. In two cases, victims were fatally 
exposed to anthrax through cross-contamination of their post in the 
mailroom sorting office.12 Therefore, the number of people who might 
have been exposed to anthrax was much higher than could have been 
expected from a crude conventional form of weapon delivery. The 
public fear reflected that, not only the uncertainty over who could have 
been exposed, but also the concern over the number of packages which 
could have been tainted, and who might be the next recipient of such a 
letter. The disruption was increased because the heightened public 
fears multiplied the number of false alarms of further anthrax attacks. 
Apart from the fear, these caused millions of dollars and tens of 
thousands of man-hours to be wasted, as each unknown had to be 
thoroughly checked and investigated.13 
Other significant incidents involving chemical or biological 
agents include the Rajneeshees, a religious cult that used salmonella 
to contaminate salad bars in Dalles, Oregon in 1984, with the intention 
of influencing a local election. In the process, the group sickened some 
751 people.14 The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA) 
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an American group influenced by Christian Identity beliefs, in the 
mid-1980s acquired a barrel of potassium cyanide, which is a toxin 
with widespread industrial uses. Their intention was to poison United 
States urban water supplies to further the group's ideological and 
religious objectives. However, the CSA's members were detained by 
the FBI before such an attack could occur.15 On 28 March 1992, the 
PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) poisoned three water tanks at a 
Turkish Air Force base outside Istanbul. The water appeared foamy, 
however, and when tested, was found to be contaminated with 
cyanide. The tanks contained fifty milligrams of cyanide per litre - a 
lethal dose.16 On 27 August 1996, detectives discovered a container of 
Sarin and twenty containers of mustard gas in Istanbul. Emin Ekinci, 
a member of the PKK, was arrested for having the agents in his 
possession.17 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have also 
resorted to non-conventional weapons. On 18 June 1990, the Sri 
Lankan Army reported that the group had attacked a Sri Lankan 
Army encampment with canisters filled with an unidentified poison 
gas, later identified as chlorine.18 
However, the most important sub-state, or "Sovereignty-Free 
Actor," usage of CBRN material occurred on 23 November 1995 when 
Chechen guerrilla leader Shamyl Basayev informed the Russian 
television network, NTV, that four cases of radioactive cesium had been 
hidden around Moscow. Russian officials largely dismissed the nuclear 
threat, claiming that the material was only cesium 137.19 Basayev was, 
however, intent on displaying his capability and on ensuring that his 
threats - to launch further attacks against Moscow unless Russia 
withdrew from Chechnya - were taken seriously.20 His warning was 
plausible because the state of the Russian nuclear industry made it 
impossible to rule out the possibility that the Chechens had indeed 
acquired dangerously radioactive material. It is important to note, 
though, that in each case the use of non-conventional weapons was 
intended for a small-scale, "tactical" attack to induce panic and not to 
attempt an act of strategic, mass-destructive terrorism. But these 
incidents do demonstrate the utility of even threatening the use of 
CBRN, and the necessity for government officials to react every and any 
time such a threat is made. It is this psychological leverage that 
motivates terrorists to pursue not only CBRN weapons but also true 
WMDs, as officials can take no chance of being wrong and therefore 
must react, granting the group greater authority. 
Aum Shinrikyo's attempted acquisition of a nuclear capability 
involved mining uranium in western Australia and attempting to 
enrich the natural uranium using lasers; a technical choice that owed 
more to Shoko Asahara's fascination with such devices than to a 
rational decision regarding the most effective technique for a nascent 
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proliferator. The cult initially sought to acquire an intact weapon from 
the former Soviet Union. It also attempted to purchase dual-use 
equipment in the United States; actively recruited physicists from 
Moscow State University and employees of Russia's premier nuclear 
research facility - the I.V. Kurchatov Institute (although Russian 
authorities deny that either of the known Aum members at the 
Institute had classified knowledge about nuclear weapons 
design)21-to join the Cult; and in 1993, sought, but were denied a 
meeting with Russian Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov to discuss the 
purchase of a nuclear warhead.22 Aum failed to acquire a nuclear 
bomb, although it is possible that they negotiated with intermediaries 
for such a purchase. This is suggested by numerous entries in the diary 
of Kiyohide Hayakawa, who made several trips to Russia on weapons-
buying expeditions.23 The cult also developed links with Russia's 
military, political, and scientific elite. During 1992 and 1993, they also 
approached Russian scientists for help with both their laser and 
nuclear programmes.24 
Al-Qa'ida and Aum Shinrikyo are by no means the only terrorist 
organizations to seek, or claim to possess, nuclear weapons. Of the 
incidents that involve weapons, rather than simply CBRN material, the 
overwhelming majority have been hoaxes. The United States 
Department of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) has 
dealt with hundreds of such hoaxes in the thirty years since its creation. 
However, aside from plans to acquire WMD or threatening the use of 
CBRN weapons and hoaxes, very few incidents have involved any such 
weapons. Such occurrences remain the exception. 
DIFFICULTIES ACQUIRING, WEAPONIZING, AND DELIVERING CBRN WEAPONS 
There are two main reasons for the relative paucity in examples of 
major incidents involving terrorist use of CBRN weapons. First, prior 
to the "WMD" assault of 9/11, many groups had simply not felt the 
need to acquire such weapons or felt moral constraints in using such 
devices. Second, and most importantly, have been the problems 
associated with acquiring and using such devices; challenges that 
continue to exist. For example, mass destruction is not guaranteed, 
even if sought, from the terrorist employment of a CBRN capability, as 
Aum Shinrikyo's experience demonstrated. The cult was well financed, 
organized, and connected, yet it largely failed in its objectives. As well 
as the sarin used in the attacks of June 1994 in Matsumoto and March 
1995 in Tokyo, the cult also sought to acquire a range of other chemical 
and biological agents including anthrax, botulinum toxin, Q-fever, 
Ebola virus, VX and hydrogen cyanide.25 Aum had difficulties devel-
oping virulent batches of the pathogens, and then in effectively 
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biotechnology. Freeze-drying and milling machines, extremely helpful 
in the conversion of agents into a dry, finely ground powder ideal for 
dispersion, are widely used in the pharmaceutical industry Legitimate 
and common usages make it difficult for law enforcement to impose 
meaningful restrictions on access to weapons-usable equipment, 
particularly if the terrorist organization operates behind a front 
company to make its purchases. 
Chemical agents, being compounds, may be acquired as a series 
of "precursors" rather than as an entire or complete agent. Acquiring 
precursors is an easier route, although tighter controls now exist for 
some of these as well, through the Chemical Weapons Convention and 
the Australia Group. Despite this, groups seeking such precursors can 
use front companies and other evasive measures to circumvent such 
restrictions, particularly if a complicit supplier can be found. In other 
cases, though, constituent chemicals are used so widely in industry 
that controlling them is all but impossible. Such chemicals can then be 
used to produce the chemical precursors or, ultimately, the chemical 
agent itself. Here, the problem for the terrorist lays not so much in 
acquiring most of the key ingredients, but in the process of manufac-
turing an effective agent from those ingredients. Although many 
"recipes" are readily available, either in the open literature or on the 
Internet, the reliability of these recipes is often limited and poses an 
equal hazard to the handler.29 
A "radiological device" is likely to be the easiest type of CBRN 
weapon for terrorists to acquire. At its simplest, it demands no more 
than conventional explosives and a radioactive source, such as cesium-
137 from a hospital X-ray machine. Such radioactive sources remain 
widespread and poorly protected, certainly compared to other types of 
nuclear materials. In spite of this, the disruptive potential of a 
radioactive weapon, or "dirty bomb," is considerable. In a press release 
dated 24 June 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
reported that the "materials needed to build a dirty bomb can be found 
in almost any country in the world, and more than 100 countries may 
have inadequate control and monitoring programs necessary to prevent 
or even detect the theft of these materials."30 Abel Gonzalez, the IAEA's 
Director of Radiation and Waste Safety, reported in October 2001 that 
"Security of radioactive materials has traditionally been relatively light 
... There are few security precautions on radiotherapy equipment and a 
large source could be removed quite easily, especially if those involved 
have no regard for their own health."31 Many such sources are presently 
without any regulatory control and are in fact unaccounted for. 
A nuclear weapon, by contrast, is likely to be the hardest type of 
CBRN device for terrorists to acquire. Terrorists intent on acquiring a 
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nuclear-yield device have three options: steal or purchase an intact 
weapon; steal or purchase a sufficient quantity of weapons-usable 
materials and build a crude nuclear-yield device; or enrich enough 
weapons-grade material to build a device. In reality the second option, 
to acquire enough weapons-usable material to build a nuclear-yield 
weapon, is widely regarded as the only likely option of the three. Most 
terrorist groups seem unlikely to follow the example of Aum Shinrikyo 
in attempting to enrich material to a weapons-usable state. The process 
is lengthy, costly, and for many of the cruder forms of enrichment, very 
easily discovered. Success is also far from assured: many state 
programs spend millions and take years trying to enrich enough 
material for a viable nuclear weapons programme. 
A group unwilling or unable to enrich its own weapons-usable 
nuclear material would have to rely on buying or stealing enough 
material, despite the incredible array of security surrounding such 
material. Acquiring sufficient nuclear material to manufacture a weapon 
is likely to prove difficult. In spite of reports of "nuclear leakage" in the 
former Soviet Union, only a handful of cases involving weapons 
significant materials are known, and never was the quantity involved 
sufficient to build a weapon. In late 2001, the IAEA stated it knew of 175 
incidents involving weapons significant material, but of those, only 18 
involved highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Moreover, the need to 
acquire a considerable quantity of fissile material would seem to 
preclude all but the most affluent of state-sponsored groups. 
However, to continue the exploration of possibilities, assuming 
enough material for a weapon could be acquired, terrorists seeking to 
build a nuclear weapon then have a number of design options: 
constructing a gun-type weapon using highly enriched uranium (HEU), 
or developing an implosion device using either HEU or plutonium. In 
terms of design, the crude gun-type device is significantly the easier of 
the two, requiring between 50 and 60 kilograms of HEU. An implosion 
device would require around 8 kilograms of plutonium. Despite the 
relatively smaller amount of necessary material, the difficulties of this 
device stem from its nature: the sphere of plutonium needs to be 
exactingly engineered, such that the shock wave from the trigger has to 
be simultaneous to within millionths of a second. If this condition is not 
met, there is a substantial risk of a comparably minor nuclear yield, or 
more likely, a failure to reach super-criticality at all. A gun-type 
assembly would have a high probability of achieving some nuclear 
yield without requiring the testing of components and using little more 
than the open literature available on the subject. An implosion device is 
more sophisticated, requiring a higher degree of technical competence. 
However, in each case, the crucial barrier remains the acquisition of 
enough nuclear material for the device.32 
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The only remaining possibility for terrorists to acquire a nuclear-
yield device is thus to steal or purchase an intact weapon. Concerns 
over nuclear-yield terrorism heightened significantly after the Soviet 
Union's collapse, owing largely to fears regarding "loose nukes" and 
the opportunities for nuclear materials and nuclear expertise to leave 
the country and be exploited by rogue states or terrorists. That 
terrorists could acquire an intact nuclear weapon seems farfetched, 
given the elaborate security forces that surround them, and their 
possession by highly trained professionals alone. States obviously have 
a considerable stake in protecting their mass-destructive weapons 
generally if not out of fear that their own WMDs would be used 
against them, then that other states would intervene and secure them 
to eliminate an unacceptable risk to their security. 
AL-QA'IDA AND ITS PURSUIT OF WMD/CBRN 
Al-Qa'ida appears to have actively pursued an "all-options strategy" 
in its attempts to acquire CBRN and WMD, simultaneously seeking 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapon options. Osama 
bin Laden purportedly went to contacts in the former Soviet Union to 
attempt to acquire an intact nuclear weapon, although his contacts 
were in Ukraine33 and the Central Asian republics. Israeli military 
intelligence claims that he paid around two million pounds to an 
intermediary in Kazakhstan, believing that, because of its substantial 
Muslim population, he had a better likelihood of acquiring a weapon 
there. This knowledge stems from a 1998 United States federal 
indictment, which claims that, "at various times from at least as early 
as 1993, Osama bin Laden and others known and unknown, made 
efforts to obtain the components of nuclear weapons."34 
Like Aum, bin Laden's group also appears to have sought to build 
a nuclear-yield weapon.35 In 1993, bin Laden's deputy, Mamdouh 
Mahmud Salim, approved the attempted purchase of enriched uranium 
"for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons," according to the 
criminal complaint lodged against Salim on 25 September 1998, although 
it is unclear whether the group succeeded in buying any nuclear material. 
36 As with several other prospective buyers of nuclear materials, al-Qa'ida 
became the object of a fraudulent scheme to supply them with useless 
nuclear material that the vendors would claim was weapons usable. In 
the case of al-Qa'ida, the offered "red mercury" turned out to be 
radioactive rubbish. They were also offered "enriched uranium" that was 
really low-grade reactor fuel, unusable in a nuclear-yield weapon 
without extensive further enrichment.37 This failure to acquire useful 
nuclear material is likely to have been a critical factor in al-Qa'ida's 
increased short-term focus on CBRN means as their weapon of choice. 
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In February 2001, Jamal Ahmed Fadl testified in the trial of the 
1998 African embassy bombers that al-Qa'ida was trying to acquire 
nuclear material from the early 1990s onwards. Fadl said that a bin 
Laden lieutenant ordered him to buy uranium from a former Sudanese 
Army officer, who offered to sell ore from South Africa for $1.5 million. 
However, Fadl was unsure whether the material was authentic, 
although it was shipped to Afghanistan all the same.38 However, as 
discussed, even a barely plausible threat of WMD or CBRN attacks 
forces officials to react, thus providing the claimant with leverage. In 
November 2001, bin Laden told a Pakistani journalist from the Urdu-
language Ausaf paper that his movement already had chemical and 
nuclear weapons. He stated: "I wish to declare that if America used 
chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with 
chemical and nuclear weapons ... We have the weapons as a deterrent."39 
The discoveries made in Afghanistan after 11 September 
demonstrate, however, that al-Qa'ida continued to prioritize CBRN for 
use as WMDs. In August 2001, an Arab delegation met scientists from 
Kabul University and offered them financial assistance in exchange for 
help and advice in locating and mining uranium within Afghanistan.40 
Although al-Qa'ida appears to have gained some material usable in a 
nuclear-yield device, both the British and American governments 
believe that the organization is incapable of producing such a weapon 
at present. However, they believe that al-Qa'ida may have 
experimented with crude chemical weapons in Afghanistan.41 In 
November, President Bush asserted that al-Qa'ida continued to seek 
chemical, biological and radiological weapons.42 
Al-Qa'ida's agents are supposed to have spent over £1 million in 
the search for enough material with which to build a radiological 
weapon.43 United States intelligence reports noted a meeting in which 
an associate of bin Laden's wielded a canister allegedly containing 
radioactive material that could be disseminated via a conventional 
explosive. However, conclusive evidence that al-Qa'ida has a 
radiological capability remains elusive. Although diagrams and 
documents relating to radiological weapons were found in 
Afghanistan, these were of a type readily available via the Internet and 
were apparently of an extremely poor quality that would be unlikely to 
work. 44 Likewise, detailed plans for a nuclear-yield device were 
discovered in one of the Kabul buildings abandoned by al-Qa'ida. 
Written in Arabic, German, Urdu, and English, the documents 
contained descriptions of how to use TNT to compress a sphere of 
plutonium into a critical mass, sparking a chain reaction.45 However, 
these documents, though clearly indicating an interest in nuclear-yield 
WMDs, also contain information that is readily available in open 
literature. The theory of such a weapon design is well known, but like 
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CBRN weapons, the practical application of that information is 
substantially more difficult, even assuming that the group could 
acquire the requisite quantity of fissile material. 
In the wake of the 11 September attacks in the United States, it has 
emerged that al-Qa'ida may have sought the means to build a "dirty 
bomb."46 Although there have been previous allegations relating to the 
organization's attempts to acquire material to build a nuclear-yield 
bomb, claims regarding a radiological weapon represent a significant 
departure. British intelligence forces are currently investigating 
allegations made by Bulgarian businessman Ivan Ivanov that he was 
approached in April 2001 by a middleman for bin Laden who sought 
to obtain radiological material. Ivanov allegedly had a series of 
meetings near the Pakistani border with Afghanistan, including one 
with bin Laden himself. He then met with a supposed "chemical 
engineer" near Rawalpindi, and was offered $200,000 to help the 
scientist acquire spent nuclear fuel rods from the Kozlodui nuclear 
electricity plant in Bulgaria. The plan would have involved buying the 
rods legally through a newly established environmental front 
company that would deal with nuclear waste. Ivanov declined the 
opportunity and reported the contact once he returned to Europe.47 
In 2001, customs officials seized ten lead-lined containers on the 
border between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The containers held a 
substantial quantity of radioactive material, ostensibly intended for a 
company in Quetta, Pakistan. The precise type of materials remains 
unclear, but it seems unlikely to have been a legitimate shipment, 
raising the alarming possibility that bin Laden's al-Qa'ida was a 
potential end-user." There must also be concerns that the main threat 
in this respect may not be "leakage" from the former Soviet Union, but 
assistance offered to al-Qa'ida by Pakistani elements. In October, two 
key former members of Pakistan's nuclear program were detained 
owing to their connections to the Taliban. Bashiruddin Mahmood was 
project director before Pakistan's 1998 tests and has since been running 
a relief organization, Ummah Tameer-I-Nau (UTN), sympathetic to the 
Afghan regime. Abdul Majid was a director of the Pakistan Atomic 
Energy Commission in 1999.49 Allegedly, they planned to use finely 
milled uranium obtained from Pakistan around a core of explosives to 
create a dirty bomb that could be delivered either as an artillery shell 
or a mortar round. However, there was no evidence that either 
Mahmood and Majid, or al-Qa'ida more generally, had been able to 
acquire such radioactive material.50 Another apparently unsuccessful 
attempt to acquire radiological materials occurred when al-Qa'ida 
tried to buy eleven pounds of thallium measuring devices from 
decommissioned Russian submarines, but were prevented from doing 
so by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB).51 
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In January 2003, the British Government alleged that al-Qa'ida 
had prioritized the development of a radiological device as early as 
1999, and had acquired not only the expertise but also the materials to 
do so in Herat, Afghanistan well prior to 9/11.52 Although the evidence 
about this is not certain, the discovery of the so-called "super-bomb" 
manual found outside Kabul in November 2001 adds weight to such a 
belief. The manual discusses not only radiological devices but also the 
construction of nuclear weapons, although the information, 
particularly in the case of the latter type of weapon, is partial.53 
The threat of a terrorist acquisition of a radiological device 
extends beyond Afghanistan. On 10 June 2002, United States Attorney-
General John Ashcroft announced the arrest of Jose Padilla for his 
involvement with al-Qa'ida in planning a radiological bomb attack on 
the United States. Pedilla, arrested in Chicago on 8 May, allegedly 
planned to build a uranium-enhanced device and had trained at an al-
Qa'ida facility in Pakistan. The plot was in its early stages; no timeline 
had been set and the radiological material had not yet been stolen from 
sources in the United States.54 Just two months earlier, Abu Zubayda, a 
captured leader of the group, claimed that al-Qa'ida not only had the 
expertise to build a radiological weapon, but also had developed one 
that was already inside the United States.55 However, the credibility of 
this claim is highly dubious. 
In addition to WMDs and radiological devices, al-Qa'ida appears 
to have attempted to acquire both chemical and biological weapons in 
addition to manufacturing their own. In March 1999, the London-
based paper Al-Sharq alAwsat revealed that associates of bin Laden, on 
trial in Egypt as part of the "Albanian Arabs" case, had allegedly been 
offered anthrax and other biological agents from a factory in East Asia 
for $3,695 plus freight charges. They also supposedly received an offer 
from a laboratory in the Czech Republic to supply a deadly gas for 
$7,500 per sample.56 Ahmad Salama Mabrouk, a member of al Jihad, 
the group to which the defendants belonged and part of bin Laden's 
coalition of organizations, gave an interview to the London paper al-
Hayat. In it, Mabrouk claimed that over the past two years, the group 
had acquired chemical and biological agents from Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, and that al-Jihad planned to use them against 
American and Israeli targets.57 Although the specific claims have been 
un verifiable, their general point was supported in June 1999 by 
anonymous American intelligence sources that told ABC News that 
"there is mounting evidence that bin Laden's network has acquired 
ingredients for chemical or biological weapons through countries that 
were once part of the Soviet Union." The same sources further claimed 
that bin Laden had set up two crude weapons laboratories in Afghan-
istan, one near Khoust and the other near Jalalabad.58 
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In the aftermath of 11 September, it has become increasingly 
obvious that al-Qa'ida's interest in CBRN weaponry has continued 
unabated. Amongst the finds have been: material relating to chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons from the Tarnak Farms site near 
Kandahar;59 information on the dispersal of anthrax in a UTN house in 
Kabul;60 information found on producing ricin in another house in 
Kabul;61 and the discovery of an al-Qa'ida volume, distributed on a CD-
Rom, that contained chapters detailing the production methods for a 
range of chemical agents and the biological agents botulinum and ricin. 
62 The eleventh edition of the group's Encyclopaedia of Jihad was devoted 
to the production of CBRN.63 The organization had maintained a series 
of laboratories in Afghanistan that were dedicated to the development 
of chemical and biological weapons. These used equipment that had 
been purchased abroad and then shipped to Afghanistan from 
countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Ukraine. 64 The 
organization appears also to have sought the help of scientists within 
Afghanistan to promote its pursuit of such weapons. Delegations of 
Pakistani scientists visited Kabul University six times since 1998, 
offering to provide funding for chemical weapons-related research and 
asking for help to obtain large quantities of sodium cyanide and thionyl 
chloride; both dual-use chemicals capable of being used to create crude 
chemical weapons. For example, thionyl chloride is a possible precursor 
for mustard gas and several nerve agents, and sodium cyanide is usable 
in the formation of a cyanide weapon.65 Most incidents however, are 
tabloid-like rumours such as the supposed discovery of thirty boxes, 
each containing ten phials of a colourless liquid, with "Sarin/V-Gas" 
marked in Cyrillic lettering on the side of each box.66 There have also 
been reports that al-Qaeda operatives continued to purchase low-level 
chemical agents such as cyanide in the wake of 9/11.67 Though al-
Qa'ida's interest in chemical and biological weapons is clear, the extent 
of the group's success in acquiring such agents is far less so. 
There have been regular claims that al-Qa'ida has received help in 
its CBW programmes, most notably from Iraq. Such claims existed well 
before 9/11: the Paris-based Arabic paper Al Watan al-Arabi suggested 
that bin Laden made contact with Qusayy, Saddam Hussein's younger 
son, and that Iraq was co-operating with al-Qa'ida's efforts to acquire 
both chemical and biological weapons.68 However, the linkage between 
Iraq and al-Qa'ida has received fresh impetus since 11 September and 
serves as a major component of the current drive to war. From 1997 
through 1998, al-Qa'ida members supposedly were trained in secret 
camps near Baghdad in how to use CBRN by instructors from a cadre 
of secret Iraqi military intelligence officers: Unit 999.69 A similar claim 
was made that Iraqi military instructors allegedly trained al-Qa'ida 
fighters in northern Iraq in the use of CBW agents during the summer 
of 2001, and possibly also in the handling of nuclear devices. Between 
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150 and 250 al-Qa'ida trainees purportedly passed through these 
training facilities.70 Again, however, the validity of this last claim is 
questionable, given that the source was DEBKA, a newsletter that relies 
heavily on hawkish Israeli intelligence sources. Nonetheless, accus-
ations and tabloid fantasy do not constitute actionable threats. 
Yet ominously, other groups linked to al-Qa'ida and operating in 
Europe appear to have been plotting to use chemical or biological 
weapons in their attacks for tactical purposes. In December 2000, 
German police intervened in an alleged plot by GSPC, an Algerian-
based group operating in Europe and associated with al-Qa'ida. It 
supposedly planned to attack the European Parliament in Strasbourg 
with sarin.71 In 2001, an Italian-based cell planned to launch an attack in 
France before being interdicted by the Italian security services. They 
discussed using "a suffocating gas" for this attack, though precise plans, 
including the attack's location, were never clarified. One possibility was 
Notre Dame in Paris, as the group discussed "La Dame" as a potential 
target. The surveillance tapes made by the Italian security services 
reveal the cell's leader, "Saber," explaining his desire to acquire 
chemical weapons because plastic explosives were outmoded, and gas 
was more effective. On 20 February 2002, Italian police arrested nine 
Moroccan nationals for allegedly plotting a chemical terrorist attack on 
the American embassy in Rome. The suspects were apprehended with 
maps detailing the location of the water pipes that serve the United 
States embassy as well as approximately nine pounds of a cyanide 
compound - potassium ferrocyanide - in their possession. More plots 
followed: in November 2002, British security officials arrested three men 
reportedly plotting a cyanide attack on the London underground.72 
In early January 2003, British authorities arrested seven North 
African men suspected of producing ricin in their north London flat.73 
There, authorities found castor oil beans and equipment that could be 
used to process those raw elements along with trace amounts of ricin.74 
Other arrests followed: six in Bournemouth and five in Manchester, 
which were tied to the ricin plot.75 American officials have stated that 
four of the Islamists originally arrested in their north London flat were 
"associates" of a fugitive al-Qa'ida leader and chemical warfare 
specialist, Abu Mus'ab al Zarqawi.76 Such a link would tie the ricin plot 
in London to al-Qa'ida, and to Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, and to the Pankisi 
Gorge in Georgia, from where terrorist cells moved into Western 
Europe, as Viktoriya Topalova discusses in her article, Lessons of the 
"Nord-Ost." The British Security Service and police forces involved in the 
north London investigation had been tipped off by French intelligence 
after several members of a French Islamist cell were arrested in 
December 2002 by the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST). 
These were part of the same network as those later arrested in London, 
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and although the French detainees were planning conventional attacks, 
they also possessed protective biochemical suits and had links to the 
Pankisi Gorge area.78 From autumn 2003, the DST had been receiving 
reports of al-Qa'ida leaders based in the Caucasus plotting a chemical 
weapons campaign. The agency suspected that ricin and potassium 
cyanide might be being smuggled into Europe, and issued a warning to 
other European intelligence agencies. 79 Based on this information, 
British police searched the Finsbury Park Mosque in London where they 
discovered a range of weapons and nuclear, biological, and chemical 
(NBC) suits.80 Further arrests followed, and many of the suspects were 
charged, as were the original detainees, with conspiring to develop or 
produce chemical weapons.81 The British arrests were followed by other 
arrests across Europe, including in Italy and Spain.82 There is an 
increased interest in chemical and biological weapons by al-Qa'ida and 
associated groups, as shown by the finds in Afghanistan and the plots to 
attack targets in Europe. However, and without wishing to appear 
complacent, there still appears to be a major disconnect between the 
current small-scale tactical attempts and an immediate threat of mass 
destruction with CBRN. The evidence listed above suggests interest in 
such agents and plots for the possible use of CBRN, and also suggests a 
growing willingness to risk handling such pathogens. However, ricin in 
particular, although highly toxic, would be difficult to use as a weapon 
to cause "mass casualties," partly because it would be difficult to 
disseminate in an effective way. Instead, it is a highly potent means of 
assassination, is easily produced using readily available raw materials 
and equipment, and as such is much more accessible than most other 
types of chemical or biological weapons. Given these characteristics, it is 
an attractive and plausible weapon of terror, in the literal sense, as much 
as a weapon of mass destruction. As already described, because of the 
terror and loathing of such weapons and their consequent political 
leverage, it would be extremely unwise to dismiss the possibility that a 
well-organized, well-funded, and well-connected group such as al-
Qa'ida could successfully acquire chemical and biological weapons and 
keep the fact hidden, especially given the diffuse global nature of the 
group. However, the evidence that they have acquired employable 
CBRN, or more importantly, any form of WMD-capable CBRN weapon 
is, even at its most pessimistic, unlikely. If the group seeks mass 
destruction rather than causing public fear and chaos with the resultant 
political leverage that would ensue, then the most plausible, likely, and 
imminent threat remains the use of conventional weapons. 
Rohan Gunaratna, one of the leading scholars on al-Qa'ida, 
suggests that the group and many of its affiliates are turning to 
"kitchen table" terrorism, relying on readily available materials for its 
attacks. This is partly the product of the splintering process that is 
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occurring at the moment within al-Qa'ida, as it increasingly relies on 
its affiliates to commit attacks, and also of the need to maximize the 
impact of such attacks with the limited resources available to 
individual cells.83 The pursuit of low-level CBW certainly fits into this 
pattern of kitchen-table terrorism, particularly if it is directed against 
the plethora of "soft targets" Western societies provide. Gunaratna 
suggests that, although al-Qa'ida will remain interested in CBRN, 
"suicide terrorism" using explosives remains its preferred means of 
maximizing its impact because of the greater likelihood of success in 
completing a conventional WMD attack over those of completing a 
CBRN attack.84 It is certainly the most plausible means by which al-
Qa'ida might cause mass casualties at present. 
CONCLUSION 
The likelihood of terrorist use of CBRN weapons in the wake of 9/11 
remains all too possible, but highly unlikely because of the difficulties 
surrounding obtaining, deploying and using such a weapon. The 
overarching issue, as it relates to terrorism with CBRN materials, is 
that we still do not really understand the motivational side of WMD, 
meaning "mass-casualty" terrorism: the killing of large numbers of 
people just for the sake of killing. Why do groups seek mass casualties 
and why do they use specific tactics to achieve that goal? Will groups 
use further mass attacks simultaneously with low technology 
weapons, as they did on 9/11? If conventional weapons are a viable 
alternative, are high-level CBRN attacks necessary? Given the 
disruption caused by, and the ease of achieving such tactics, are low-
level CBRN attacks more likely than WMD attacks? Why are some 
vulnerable targets, such as agriculture or facilities other than reactors, 
that seem attractive rarely targeted by terrorists?85 By answering some 
of these questions, as well as tying these answers to knowledge of 
specific terrorist organizations, it might be possible to better answer 
whether WMD terrorism using CBRN is a matter of if or when. 
The scale of the attacks suggests that mass destructive terrorism is 
now a fact; it thus seems unlikely that, given the option, al Qaeda would 
avoid using CBRN weapons to cause mass casualties. However, 
although discoveries in Afghanistan and the disruption of plots in 
Europe continue to show that al-Qa'ida and its associated groups are 
interested in CBRN weapons, these discoveries do not indicate that the 
organisation has successfully acquired such weapons and now has the 
capability to use them successfully. Rather, the evidence suggests that al 
Qaeda has simply being trying to develop any type of weapon that 
might help its cause, including chemical or biological agents such as 
ricin that are an effective weapon of terror, more than of mass casualties. 
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The suggestion, therefore, would be that CBRN weapons are being 
pursued simply as part of a range of options, for instrumental purposes, 
rather than as an end in itself. Such an attack itself, rather than the 
means, remains the focus of the enterprise. The attacks of 11 September 
demonstrate however that CBRN weapons are not necessary to cause 
mass casualties or constitute a WMD attack. CBRN weapons and WMD 
are not synonymous. Given the difficulty and expense of acquiring and 
effectively using such weapons, along with the uncertain outcome of 
any such attempt, al-Qa'ida may continue to seek CBRN weapons 
because of their special status and leverage, but is likely not going to 
rely on doing so successfully. The attacks of 11 September and the 
subsequent discoveries in Afghanistan suggest a group that is 
pragmatic and has an instrumental approach to CBRN acquisition. If 
mass casualties are the goal of the group, then conventional weapons 
remain the most viable option. Conversely, scholars such as Rohan 
Gunaratna suggest that al-Qa'ida may be moving into a phase where it 
seeks to achieve "high-impact terrorism," such as that carried out most 
recently in Spain, but without necessarily engaging in the same 
operational scale that 9/11 demonstrated.86 In this scenario, pathogens 
such as ricin offer a relatively accessible means of achieving such an 
effect without necessarily resorting to mass casualties. 
The implications of 11 September on other groups seeking CBRN 
weapons remains to be seen. Clearly, the level of fear and awareness of 
potential attacks with such weapons has risen to unprecedented levels. 
However, this does not necessarily equate to an increased likelihood of 
CBRN weapons being used by sub-state actors, except for disruptive 
purposes. The 11 September attacks raised the bar for terrorist violence, 
but they also demonstrated that the innovative use of conventional 
weapons can achieve this purpose more reliably and efficiently than 
CBRNs. Owing to the technical challenges posed in successfully using 
CBRN weapons, conventional weapons remain more probable 
instruments for terrorists intent on causing mass destruction. In terms 
of terrorists using CBRNs as a means of delivering a CBRN attack, the 
question remains one of "if," rather than "when." However, to ensure 
the question retains this answer and remains one of academic 
speculation, vigilance must be truly eternal. In terms of whether 
terrorists will ever successfully mount another attack on the scale of 
WMDs, as the recent attacks in Spain have demonstrated all too 
painfully, the question tragically remains one of "when." 
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A Critical Assessment of 
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Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty 
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INTRODUCTION One of the most important yet neglected aspects relating to a 
proposed fissile material cutoff is the cost of its verification. 
Although verification expenses are crucial for the viability of the 
fissile material cutoff regime, few such estimates are available. To that 
end, this article examines in an independent manner the estimated costs 
of the cutoff, including analyses of configurations of the cutoff itself and 
the various verification systems that may be put in place. It also 
itemizes some of the prominent matters that must be taken into account 
for the creation of such a verification regime. 
In March 1995, the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament 
reached a consensus on establishing an Ad Hoc Committee to study 
the mandate of a proposed convention on a ban on the production of 
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
The consensus was based on United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 48/75L, which read, in part: 
The General Assembly ... 
1. Recommends the negotiation in the most appropriate 
international forum of a non-discriminatory multilateral and 
internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the 
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices; 
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Existing Regimes and Exploring New Dimensions, ed. P. Gizewski (Toronto: 
Centre for International and Security Studies, York University), 107-28. 
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2. Requests the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide 
assistance for examination of verification arrangements for such 
a treaty as required; 
3. Calls upon all states to demonstrate their commitment to the 
objectives [of such a treaty]. 
In short, the treaty is to be non-discriminatory, multilateral, and 
internationally and effectively verifiable, and may involve the IAEA 
(International Atomic Energy Agency) for verification of compliance. 
The resolution specifically does not mention fissile material stockpiles1 
and deals with production only. Although consensus was reached on 
the requirement for the negotiating committee, it did not come about 
effortlessly, and the central mandate of the proposed treaty remains a 
controversial topic. One main point of contention was the inclusion of 
stocks in the cutoff treaty. This polarized the nuclear possessing states 
against some nuclear threshold states and the non-aligned movement. 
Resolving this controversy is the linchpin for the success of the cutoff 
treaty talks. To be clear, the assumptions of this report are that existing 
stocks (including "grandfathered" holdings of HEU and plutonium, 
spent fuel, or civilian material) will not be included in any preliminary 
agreement. The material in question herein refers to new production of 
explosive fissile material only. 
The Conference on Disarmament chose UNGA 48/75L as its 
starting position, owing to the level of unanimity on the central 
purpose of that resolution. While stocks would not be part of the 
official mandate, the proposed convention would not "preclude any 
delegation from raising for consideration" the issue of stockpiles. 
However, notwithstanding the inclusion of stocks as an item for 
discussion, the most likely direction for a cutoff treaty would be to deal 
with new production of fissile material first, and perhaps make 
reference to the need to deal with stocks at a future date. With this in 
mind, the analysis presented here is concerned with the issues and 
costs surrounding an initial production ban (stockpile cap) agreement. 
OUTLINE OF EXISTING ANALYSES: ASSUMPTIONS, SCOPE, AND OPTIONS 
Two reasonably comprehensive analyses of the costs attributed to a 
verification strategy for a cutoff treaty have been prepared by the IAEA 
and by the United States Department of Energy. The IAEA Secretariat 
working paper is entitled "A Cutoff Treaty and Associated Costs," by 
Vilmos Cserveny (henceforth referred to as Cserveny, or IAEA),2 and 
the Energy Department document is entitled "Routine Inspection Effort 
Required for Verification of a Nuclear Material Production Cutoff 
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Convention," by Leslie Fishbone and Jonathan Sanborn of the 
Brookhaven National Laboratory (henceforth referred to as Fishbone 
and Sanborn, or Brookhaven).3 These two studies raise concerns that 
are vital for a verification regime because they determine the scope of 
verification, and by extrapolation, its effectiveness. 
CSERVENY/IAEA 
The Cserveny piece considers some of the anticipated costs of a 
verification programme by the IAEA Secretariat. Its basic assumptions are: 
- that the cutoff treaty would adhere to the guidelines of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as signatory states 
would not undertake fissile materials development and also 
would not assist others in pursuing such a programme; 
- that the technical objective of the agency (IAEA or other) 
charged with the verification of the regime would be to guard 
against increasing existing nuclear weapon arsenals and the 
creation of new weapons arsenals; 
- that the cutoff would pertain to new production of strategic 
fissile material after the date of the entry into force of the treaty.4 
Cserveny's summary also poses some issues requiring clarification 
before an effective verification regime may be put in place, including: 
- whether or not verification will include coverage of existing 
stockpiles of material that could be directed towards military 
programmes; 
- the possible inclusion of military material that is not currently 
used in weapons programmes (for example, HEU in submarines, 
research material, and other non-proscribed military purposes); 
- the need to distinguish between military and civilian nuclear 
material (the "dual use" issue), especially because countries have 
different interpretations regarding the relationship of these 
typologies; 
- how the verification mechanism might attend to the matter of 
undeclared nuclear facilities and material.5 
The IAEA study outlines four alternatives for verification (discussed in 
greater detail later), including: 
1) comprehensive verification, including all nuclear material 
possessed by a state, aside from that in military stockpiles at the 
time of the agreement's entry into force; 
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2) limited verification of separated fissile material; 
3) full verification of separated material and associated prod-
uction facilities; 
4) full verification of separated and irradiated fissile material. 
It also outlines some of the resource requirement issues relating to 
verification, particularly those relating to declared and undeclared 
facilities. Finally, the data are based on up to 995 facilities that would 
require verification. Importantly, costs calculated in this study are not 
based on current IAEA average "person days of inspection," or PDI; cost 
per person day of inspection ($/PDI) are estimated. As discussed below, 
the basic criteria outlining how the IAEA calculates PDI are not included 
in the agency's analysis, and in fact, several suggestions are made 
regarding what the costs per PDI would be, and the number of PDI 
required each year (PDI/yr) is estimated for the verification process. 
FISHBONE AND SANBORN/BROOKHAVEN 
The Brookhaven study was undertaken under the auspices of a United 
States Department of Energy contract. It assumes that: 
- the IAEA would be the agency likely to undertake verification; 
- implemented verification arrangements would be modelled 
along the lines of established NPT procedures; 
- primary attention should be paid to eight states: the declared 
nuclear weapon states, India, Pakistan, and Israel; 
- undeclared sites and activities, while important for a truly 
comprehensive verification plan, are beyond the scope of an 
initial study; 
- the material involved includes production for explosive use, or 
outside of international safeguards, allowing for continued 
production of HEU and Pu in a non-proscribed manner.6 
Furthermore, the Brookhaven study outlines three verification options 
available: 
1) broad inspection, similar to NPT requirements and patterned 
closely after INFCIRC/153. The model involves: 
i) the prevention of material diversion; 
ii) all peaceful activities involving fissile material; and 
iii) materials accountancy supplemented by containment and 
surveillance. 
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2) NPT-Iike requirements, but with a scope restricted to certain 
facility types, particularly enrichment and reprocessing sites. The 
main concerns here would be the detection of undeclared 
facilities and to stop the diversion of material; and 
3) less intensive verification involving greatly reduced inspec-
tions but with a strong emphasis on declaration. 
The Brookhaven study suggests that verification would apply to up to 
655 facilities worldwide, and uses $/PDI for its calculation. 
ESTIMATES: COSTS OUTLINED BY THE STUDIES 
The costs of verifying a fissile materials production cutoff will fall on a 
number of actors. Obviously, some costs will be associated with the 
operation of a verification agency, most likely the IAEA. Both studies 
focus on these costs. Omitted, then, are the costs that might fall on 
other actors, such as state agencies implementing the cutoff provisions 
domestically (for example, State Systems of Accounting and Control, 
discussed later) and facility operators affected by verification activities 
and requirements. If, for example, the Russian SSAC needs substantial 
improvement, as is feared, or there are others also needing assistance 
in some affected states, there could be significant one-time costs in 
addition to recurring state costs.7 As well, although the problem of 
guarding against undeclared activities must be addressed, the focus on 
the verification agency as such either could imply (as we shall see, 
wrongly) that these costs are entirely included in the capabilities of 
that agency and its activities, or that they are assigned to state agencies 
that might normally undertake national intelligence and monitoring 
functions. If the costs fall to state agencies, they are ignored in these 
two studies. Thus, only agency costs are covered, and to that extent, 
both these studies understate the total costs of verification. 
Furthermore, only some agency activities are covered. Both focus 
on routine inspection efforts, using IAEA estimates of effort as a 
foundation. This covers the running costs of a verification system, but 
it omits certain other activities. The ad hoc, initial, or baseline 
inspections necessary to implement a verification system and the costs 
of acquiring and installing appropriate equipment are apparently 
omitted. These could be quite substantial initially though tapering off 
to a much lower proportion of expenses as the verification system is 
phased in. Costs associated with special inspections or challenge 
inspections are not noted, though they might be relatively small unless 
such rights were vigorously exercised. 
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Both studies focus on the five declared nuclear weapon states and 
the three threshold states (Israel, Pakistan, and India). Both focus on 
the production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium -
neither thorium nor tritium are of particular concern. While the 
estimates do not explicitly state (yet both strongly suggest) that the 
IAEA is the verifying agency both use IAEA-based data. Neither 
covers the start-up costs for a new agency, and particularly in the case 
of the Cserveny study, one could assume that IAEA implementation is 
the basic assumption. Both survey a range of options (three in the 
Brookhaven study and four in the Cserveny study) varying between 
INFCIRC/153-style verification arrangements at the high end, and 
much more limited arrangements for the low end of their estimates. 
Beyond this, however, there are a number of substantial 
differences. Tables 1 and 2 give comparable numerical data for the 
Brookhaven and the Cserveny studies, respectively. 
Table 1. 
Summary Data for the Brookhaven Study 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Total PDI 28975 22875 8296 
Cost ($ million) 230 184 66 
Number of 
Facilities 655 approx. 300? approx. 300? 
Table 2. 
Summary Data for the IAEA Study 
Alternative A Alternative B Alternative C Alternative D 
Total PDI 4629 16271 22113 25398 
Cost 
($ million) 
40 90 120 140 
Number of 
Facilities 
195 195 645 995 
The differences between the two sets of data are particularly 
striking at the high end of their comprehensive safeguards estimates 
(Option 1 and Alternative D), but they are evident throughout. 
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Cserveny's cost and PDI figures are noticeably lower than those in the 
Brookhaven study yet his comprehensive alternative appears to cover 
half again as many facilities as the Brookhaven estimate. It could be, of 
course, that different facility counting rules explain some of this. 
Upon inspection, further differences between the two studies 
become apparent. The Fishbone-Sanborn study calculates the number 
of facilities of a given type in each of the eight states covered and 
estimates the number of PDIs per year necessary for routine inspection 
for each type of facility, whether operational or shut down. It then 
totals the PDI figures for each option and multiplies that figure by an 
estimate of $8,000/PDI as a surrogate for total costs. The figure of 
$8,000/PDI is based on the IAEA's 1993 budget estimate and PDI 
output. (Actual regular expenditures on safeguards were somewhat 
lower, and the actual PDI figure was also a bit lower, but the effects on 
their final cost figures are not problematic.) The options vary in the 
facilities covered and the degree of inspection effort needed to meet the 
specific verification objectives under each option. The resulting 
numbers seem internally consistent but include, as they note, a number 
of assumptions and simplifications. The numbers presented are thus 
subject to significant uncertainties; in fact, they actually serve as 
illustrations of alternative assumptions rather than as predictions.8 
The Fishbone-Sanborn study does not really provide firm 
numbers, but it does outline the basis for its results. The Cserveny 
study, in contrast, although at best a preliminary estimate, merely 
notes that it draws on IAEA data and calculations and then presents 
only its final figures. Like the Fishbone-Sanborn study, Cserveny 
reports a $/PDI figure, but his numbers assuredly are not based on a 
simple multiplication of PDI estimates by a $/PDI rate. This can be 
demonstrated quite simply. If we take the only $/PDI figure Cserveny 
reports, $7200/PDI, and multiply it by his PDI estimates, we get 
estimates for Alternatives A through D of $33M, $117M, $159M, and 
$182M, respectively, and these amounts are significantly higher than 
the figures he actually reports.9 Quite clearly, if Cserveny's $/PDI figure 
is to be taken seriously, there must be other factors at work to generate 
his reported costs. There is no basis given, however, for identifying or 
estimating either the effects or the roots of these factors. 
COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF COMPOSITE ALTERNATIVES/OPTIONS 
It is instructive to compare the IAEA and Brookhaven categories 
(regarding their Alternatives/Options) to get a stronger sense of some 
of the factors generating their different estimates of the cost of 
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verifying a fissile materials production cutoff. Doing so gives us a 
foundation for the examination of cutoff verification issues that follow 
and provides a clearer understanding of their respective assumptions. 
This comparison is tentative, however, since the terms in which they 
present their results are neither fully detailed nor readily available. For 
reference, tables 1 and 2 provide comparable summary data for the two 
studies; tables 3 and 4 provide broad and specific breakdowns of the 
categories themselves. 
The differences between the two sets of options are quite striking. 
The Brookhaven study, in its most comprehensive option, covers 655 
facilities at 28975 PDI, arriving at a cost of US$230 million, while the 
IAEA, for 995 facilities, suggests 25398 PDI for a cost of US$140 
million. Therefore, the IAEA study submits that it can cover 53 per cent 
more facilities with 90 per cent of the PDI and only 60 per cent of the 
Brookhaven cost. 
Table 4, which attempts to group the studies' various options in 
comparable sub-categories of facility types, provides somewhat 
greater detail. It suggests some general conclusions that hold across 
the two studies. Reprocessing is by far the most significant area of 
verification. Enrichment takes up perhaps surprisingly little effort as 
compared to, for example, verification at fuel fabrication and 
conversion plants. However, the differences between the two studies 
are even more striking when broken down, and they are 
overwhelmingly driven by their differing estimates in reprocessing 
verification. Outside of this factor, it is notable that, except for 
Alternative A as compared to Option 3 in the category "Enrichment" 
and Alternative B as compared to option 2 in "Other" (see table 4), the 
IAEA study otherwise suggests the larger PDI figures. Four very broad 
sets of differences, acting individually and collectively, possibly 
generate the differences in these more detailed estimates within and 
between the two studies: 
1) differences in the sorts of facilities to be verified; 
2) differences in estimates of the number of operating facilities of 
a given type that would have to be covered; 
3) differences in the level of verification required; and 
4) differences in the estimated PDI necessary to verify at a given level. 
In their broadest logic, the two studies move from the least to the 
most comprehensive categories in similar terms. Alternative A and 
Option 3 focus narrowly on the immediate production of fissile 
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material, particularly at reprocessing and enrichment plants and at 
other facilities directly associated with such material (for example, fuel 
fabrication and conversion plants using plutonium or HEU). These two 
options also adopt a lower standard of verification activity than that 
found in "f u l l " IAEA verification. The most demanding options, 
Alternative D and Option 1, call for comprehensive safeguarding along 
lines similar to INFCIRC/153 and full coverage (within the limits of the 
cutoff) of the peaceful fuel cycle, with the full panoply of IAEA 
verification activities. Option 2 and Alternative B do not expand the 
range of facilities as compared to Option 3 and Alternative B, but they 
do move to "IAEA standards" of verification in the Brookhaven study 
and to verification of the complete material balance in the IAEA study 
(there is some ambiguity here, however). The IAEA study's Alternative 
C further expands the list of facility types to be verified, and in 
particular, adds verification of spent fuel (which is only included in the 
Brookhaven study in Option 1). In the broadest terms, for both the 
level of verification and the sorts of facilities included, the following 
seem roughly comparable: Option 3 and Alternative A; Option 2 and 
Alternative B (Alternative C, somewhat less so); and Option 1 and 
Alternative D (for reference, see table 3). 
Differences in facility types listed in roughly comparable options 
do not carry enough of the burden of explanation for the discrepancies 
between the two studies. The aggregate differences in PDI estimates 
are significant - on the order of 3600 PDI - for both Option 3/ 
Alternative A and Option 1/Alternative D. They are greatest, at 
roughly 6600 PDI, however, for the Option 2/Alternative B pair. It 
would take considerable discrepancies in estimates of the actual 
number of facilities to be covered to account for some of these 
differences. While Alternative C introduces spent fuel verification, 
Option 2 does not. Verification of temporary storage at reactor sites 
might account for some of the PDI difference in the "power reactor" 
category between Alternative C and Option 2, but there is insufficient 
detail to confirm this. As well, while the Brookhaven study gives broad 
estimates of numbers of facilities (for instance, thirty-four reprocessing 
plants and twenty-four enrichment plants), it does not provide further 
detail, while the IAEA study does not offer even this breakdown. 
Levels of verification required for a given option explains some 
of the difference. In the Option 3/Alternative A pair, the IAEA study 
calls only for input-output verification and does not include process 
verification. This can generate very significant savings, particularly in 
verification at enrichment and reprocessing plants. The Brookhaven 
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study, however, assumes some reduction in inventory verification in 
Option 3, but still calls for some flow verification. This could explain 
some of its higher PDI estimates for enrichment and reprocessing in 
this pair. However, this broad explanation fails in the Option 2/ 
Alternative B coupling, where Brookhaven calls for "IAEA standards" 
and the IAEA study calls for "complete material balance" verification. 
Assuming these have the same meaning, and that the facilities' types 
and numbers are roughly comparable, Brookhaven estimates 7000 PDI 
more for reprocessing than Alternative B (and the same amount for 
Alternative C), but 600-700 PDI less for enrichment. The differences 
here seem far more likely to arise either from differing estimates for 
verification at a given level, or from vastly different estimates of the 
number of facilities, especially reprocessing plants, to be verified. 
In general, then, the two studies view reprocessing verification 
requirements quite differently, and this difference accounts for the 
aggregate higher Brookhaven estimates. However, in virtually every 
other category, the IAEA study in fact sees the PDI demands as greater 
than the Brookhaven study. Without more detail than the studies 
provide, further explanations/explorations of these differences are not 
readily available. 
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Table 4. 
Specified Grouping of IAEA and Brookhaven Options 
in Comparable Categories 





IAEA: Alt. A 1626 310 240 2453 
(4626 PDI, in %) 35.1 6.7 5.2 53.1 
IAEA: Alt. B 8681 1946 240 5405 
(16271 PDI, in %) 53.4 14.7 1.5 33.2 
IAEA: Alt. C 8681 2051 4656 6725 
(22113 PDI, in %) 39.3 9.3 21.1 30.4 
IAEA: Alt. D 8681 2051 4656 10010 
(25398 PDI, in %) 34.2 8.1 18.3 39.4 
Brookhaven: Opt. 3 5290 756 2250 
(8296 PDI, in %) 63.8 9.1 27.1 
Brookhaven: Opt. 2 15715 1290 5870 
(22875 PDI, in %) 68.7 5.6 25.7 
Brookhaven: Opt. 1 15715 1290 3868 8102 
(28975 PDI, in %) 54.2 4.4 13.5 28.0 
Notes: Numbers on the first line of each cell indicate PDI for each component of the 
Alternatives/Options; Indented numbers on the second line of each cell indicate the 
percentage of total PDI for that Alternative/Option. 
* Brookhaven simply bring together power and plutonium production reactors. The 
IAEA study at times differentiates between types of power reactors, Alternatives A and 
B include only LEU-MOX reactors, while Alternative C includes all power reactors 
(LEU-MOX and others). 
** The IAEA lists a number of other specific facility types and gives PDI numbers and 
percentages. Brookhaven note some facility types, but estimates of PDI numbers group 
these together. 
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PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO THE USE OF PDI AS A SURROGATE FOR COSTS 
Another conclusion we reach is the need for more data on at least some 
of the issues noted above, as well as greater clarity regarding the 
estimating process. In the case of Fishbone and Sanborn, we have an 
admittedly preliminary estimate based on an extremely simple, 
fundamental calculation: PDI x $/PDI. 10 In the IAEA study, cost 
estimates and some limited breakdowns are given, but we have no 
basis with which to discover the method used or on how the criteria 
that produce these final figures are chosen. Fishbone and Sanborn 
provide estimates of PDI requirements for different facilities, but IAEA 
data is necessary for comparative purposes. Brookhaven estimates 9 
PDI/yr for a light water reactor (LWR),11 but a separate IAEA study that 
included one of Brookhaven's principal researchers estimated 6.5 
PDI/yr for an "average" LWR.12 The Brookhaven estimate could be 
"double-counting" some PDIs, if a single inspector can under some 
circumstances, perform two tasks on a given day. 
PDI as a surrogate for costs is inconvenient, as the actual 
expenditures of the IAEA versus PDI calculations vary from year to 
year. The following table bears this out. 
Table 5. 
IAEA PDI Calculations (1 989-1 994) 
Year PDI 
Expenditures 
Actual (in $) $/PDI 
1989 10132 50,462,307 4980 
1990 10381 61,180,091 5893 
1991 9442 56,382,190 5971 
1992 8385 58,637,003 6993 
1993 8153 63,715,708 7815 
1994 9152 65,483,281 7155 
mean 9274.2 6467.8 
Source: IAEA; not arranged by individual IAEA Division estimates. 
As can be seen, there is considerable variation from year to year. 
Aside from establishing a standard deviation, which is problematic 
given the range of activities and facilities that may be included, PDI 
and $/PDI do not provide a fully operable tool for study. Furthermore, 
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Table 7 interprets the data in table 6 as PDI. What is particularly 
striking here is the variance of PDI figures; this variance demonstrates 
the extent of the potential and actual problems that stem from using 
surrogate costing tools such as $/PDI. 
Table 7. 
Alternative Calculations of IAEA $/PDI Figures/Budgets 











1990 5220 3760 2722 n/a n/a 
1991 6897 4882 3623 n/a 2686 
1992 7121 4945 3543 n/a 3619 
1993 7982 5668 4405 n/a 3910 
1994 7462 5688 4249 3821 3809 
1995 7123 5521 4151 3753 3753 
Source: IAEA 
Given the variation in costs and activities as borne out by tables 6 
and 7, the use of $/PDI as a "surrogate" for real costs may illustrate the 
"fallacy of the indicator": the use of convenient though unreliable 
numbers if more meaningful figures are not available. As a result, it 
may not present a useful estimate given the variation attributable to 
facilities and verification procedures and to the individual issues 
relating to specific sites. What all of this indicates is an essential 
criticism of the existing analyses (based on inaccurate PDI calculations): 
variances of between 50-100 per cent demonstrate at best a very rough 
estimate of costs; indeed, the variance may result in tens of millions of 
dollars. In short, ambiguities in estimates produce serious variations 
where specifics regarding verification systems and scope (indeed, the 
entire category of issues presented in this report: scope, location, 
participation, range, and character) are not adequately detailed. 
CRITIQUE OF THE TWO REPORTS: 
DISCREPANCIES AND INCONSISTENCIES DISCOVERED 
Despite the fact that both the IAEA and Brookhaven studies are based 
on IAEA data, it is striking that their respective estimates - notably 
their most comprehensive figures - are so disparate. Broad inspections, 
according to the Brookhaven study, would cover 655 facilities at 28,975 
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PDI for a total cost of US$230 million; on the other hand, the IAEA 
suggests that 995 facilities would be included in a comprehensive 
verification programme, calculated at 25,398 PDI for a total cost of 
US$140 million. Therefore, the IAEA study suggests that, with 53 per 
cent more facilities to inspect, total costs would be only 60 per cent of 
what the Brookhaven analysis estimates. Furthermore, the IAEA figures 
indicate significantly lower PDI costs than those of the Brookhaven 
study (US$7200 versus US$8000). 
Despite the questions concerning the Cserveny study's figures, it 
is the Fishbone-Sanborn study that indicates the factors that could 
affect their calculations. Taking these into account, and noting some 
others and some features of their methods of calculation, we could 
reasonably suggest that their cost estimates and PDI estimates may be 
too high.14 To that extent, the Fishbone-Sanborn study may serve as an 
outside estimate of costs. Without further information about the 
Cserveny study's figures, assumptions, and methods of calculation, we 
cannot say whether or to what degree this is more likely to be a more 
accurate set of estimates. 
Aside from the confusion regarding calculated PDI in these studies, 
there are some issues raised by or within these two studies, including: 
1) The effect of the New Partnership Arrangement (NPA) with 
EURATOM on IAEA costs. The IAEA expects to realize substantial 
savings in PDIs through this arrangement. One estimate suggests 
that as much as 2100 of a current 3100 PDI could be saved.15 As 
Fishbone and Sanborn estimate that some 183 affected facilities 
(of a total of up to 655) and up to 11,000 PDI of inspection effort 
could be in Britain and France, savings under this arrangement, if 
not already taken into account, could be significant.16 
2) The number of facilities coming under a cutoff which are currently 
under INFCIRC/66 Rev. 2 safeguards. India and Pakistan account for 
up to forty facilities in the Fishbone-Sanborn estimate, and up to 
roughly 3,400 PDI of inspection effort. A small number of these 
facilities are under INFCIRC/66 Rev. 2 safeguards, thus generating 
another saving. Facilities currently under INFCIRC/66 or other 
non-NPT safeguards in India, Pakistan, and Israel include: 
- India: two power reactors, two fuel fabrication plants, one 
reprocessor; 
- Pakistan: one power reactor, two research reactors or critical 
assemblies, one separate storage facility; and 
- Israel: one research reactor or critical assembly.17 
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3) The status of facilities associated with plutonium production for 
weapons purposes. It would be reasonable to assume that many 
facilities - at least military plutonium production reactors and 
possibly some military reprocessors - would be shut down or 
even decommissioned after a cutoff came into force. Fishbone and 
Sanborn estimate that an operational plutonium reprocessing 
plant could take 935 PDI of inspection, while a shut-down plant 
could take as little as 30. Some of these, not being designed with 
safeguards in mind, might call for a larger-than-usual effort. 
Potentially significant reductions might thus be possible here, 
depending on the status of these facilities. 
4) The status of facilities associated with the civilian plutonium 
economy, and of civilian reprocessing plants and facilities producing or 
using MOX fuel. Both seem to absorb a significant proportion of 
the inspection effort. State plans for the civilian use of plutonium 
would thus have a significant effect on any verification costs. 
5) The effects of the IAEA's "93+2" programme and of specific 
techniques which might reduce the inspection burden. Neither study 
makes any reference to the IAEA's "93+2" programme of 
safeguards, which sought to achieve greater efficiency in resource 
use. It is likely the case that the efforts estimated are based on 
current rather than possibly lower future values. As an example, 
although a separate IAEA study reported 6.5 PDI/yr for a LWR, it 
also suggested that this could be reduced to 4.5 PDI/yr through 
the mailing-in of television data.18 This is a saving of almost a 
third, and saves half again over the Brookhaven analysis figures. 
6) Efficiency in the use of inspectors as well as efforts to raise this. 
Brookhaven suggests that in 1993, roughly 200 IAEA inspectors 
produced about 8,100 PDI of inspection, thus approximately 40 
PDI/inspector/year. 19 This seems broadly in line with a Los 
Alamos Laboratory estimate that the average IAEA inspector 
spends about 90 days/year on field duty, of which about 50 are 
inspection duty.20 Anything that could increase the number of 
PDI/inspector/year would entail obvious cost savings by 
reducing the number of additional personnel to support the 
verification effort. For most of the "P5+3" states in a cutoff, the 
number of facilities within their borders could justify country, or 
at least regional, offices. This could reduce both travel costs and 
time and thus increase the efficiency of inspectors within these 
states. Estimates of savings from the IAEA's Toronto and Tokyo 
offices could be useful in this regard. 
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7) The general set of affected facilities. The difference in facility 
numbers reported by Brookhaven on the one hand and by the 
IAEA study on the other could be due to mere counting 
differences. It would be useful to draw up a clear list of facilities 
that could be affected under varying configurations of a 
verification system. This would both reduce this possible source 
of difference and offer a more accurate estimate of the actual set 
of facilities to be included. 
In general, and bearing in mind that Brookhaven includes 
safeguards for reactors only in Option 3, the two estimates agree at least 
on the rough order of which areas require the most effort. Both focus 
above all on reprocessing, while "other" facilities come next. 
Enrichment verification accounts for surprisingly little PDI. For 
reprocessing and enrichment, the IAEA's Alternatives B, C, and D are 
effectively the same. For power and production reactors, Alternatives C 
and D are very similar. For the Brookhaven study, Options 1 and 2 are 
the same for reprocessing and enrichment, though Option 2 would see 
a higher overall emphasis on these requirements. For power and 
plutonium reactors, general PDI comparison shows that the IAEA's 
Alternatives C and D and Brookhaven's Option 1 are relatively similar 
in enrichment (the Brookhaven estimate is lower), while for "other" 
facilities, similarities exist between B)srookhaven's Option 3 and IAEA's 
Alternative A; Brookhaven's Option 2 and IAEA's Alternatives B and C; 
and Brookhaven's Option 1 and IAEA's Alternative D. It should be 
noted, however, that Brookhaven's estimates for PDIs for reprocessing 
are nearly double those of the IAEA, and Brookhaven's estimates of 
enrichment PDI are either approximately double for Brookhaven's 
Option 1/IAEA's Alternative A, or (for Brookhaven's Options 1 and 2), 
and 60 per cent of IAEA estimates for Alternatives B, C, or D. The 
IAEA's "other" estimates are somewhat above the Brookhaven figures. 
From all of this, three very broad questions are raised: 
1) Why are IAEA estimates for reprocessing substantially lower 
than Brookhaven's? 
2) Why are Brookhaven's estimates (except for Option 3) for 
enrichment so much lower than the IAEA's? 
3) What accounts for the approximately 20 per cent difference 
between the two studies on power reactors and plutonium 
production reactors? The IAEA's reprocessing figures are well 
below Brookhaven's, but are actually greater than Brookhaven's 
in almost all other instances, except some Alternative A/ Option 
3 comparisons. 
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Some of these concerns are particularly relevant. The large 
discrepancies in the more detailed estimates of PDI for both studies 
could account for much of the excess of the Brookhaven study over the 
IAEA version (for example, Alternative A versus Option 3 for 
reprocessing; and Alternatives B and C and Options 1 and 2). This is 
notable, given that most other IAEA estimates are either roughly 
comparable or greater than those of the Brookhaven study. 
OVERVIEW OF ISSUES PERTAINING TO DECLARATION AND VERIFICATION 
There are several issues relating to declaration and verification that 
must be taken into account. First, regarding the fissile material itself, a 
production ban treaty would obligate the verification programme to 
focus on the cessation of new production. Second, isotopie levels of 
uranium and plutonium are a controversial issue. As a benchmark, 
military uranium production is usually depicted as the point where the 
fissile isotope U-235 moves beyond 20 weight per cent (w/o).21 For 
plutonium, "production" is when plutonium is converted from 
uranium in a reactor, or when plutonium is separated from fission 
products. However, actual weapons have been manufactured with a 
fissile isotopie level as low as 12 w/o U-235 (what is commonly referred 
to as "slightly" enriched uranium [SEU]). For plutonium, any w/o level 
of the fissile isotope Pu-239 would facilitate weapons development. 
A third concern has to do with the facilities targeted for 
verification. For uranium, separation and enrichment facilities would 
be necessary. It would also be necessary to monitor new production of 
plutonium in nuclear reactors. Plutonium manufacturing is 
unavoidable in reactors, where U-238 is transmuted to create 
plutonium. However extensive verification is necessary to govern 
activities at reprocessing plants where plutonium is separated from 
fission products, creating an explosive strategic material.22 We need 
also to address the more complicated issue of attempting to account for 
undeclared facilities and the dual use problem23 (assuming a "wide 
scope" verification regime). Ignoring civilian-only facilities might lead 
to the transfer of clandestine military activities to civilian facilities. 
Further complicating the dual use consideration is the fact that 
production of plutonium and HEU may be for civilian purposes, such 
as laboratory use, research reactors, critical assemblies, or research into 
mixed oxide (MOX).24 
Once the material and facilities are identified, the scope of the 
verification regime must also be stipulated, including technical 
requirements and material types, quantities that would qualify for 
inspection, and sources of information sought - states, facilities, and 
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non-state facility outsiders (that is, criminal activity). A comprehensive 
verification regime would also require the identification of the proper 
agency or organization to carry it out - the IAEA, national bodies, 
another multilateral system, a regional system (for instance, Euratom) -
and the degree of autonomy given to that agency. In short, cessation of 
production of fissile material would necessitate verifying the following: 
- closing military production plants; 
- monitoring other production plants that remain for civilian fuel 
cycle and research purposes; 
- monitoring reprocessing within plants that remain open; and 
- monitoring to guard against new illicit operations. 
Furthermore, there is the issue of how a verification process might be 
modelled. One inspection pattern based on INFCIRC/153 involves: 
i) the prevention of material diversion; 
ii) all peaceful activities; and 
iii) materials accountancy being supplemented by containment 
and surveillance. 
Another is based on INFCIRC/66, which is less inclusive and 
would pertain directly to plants, facilities, and materials subject to the 
agreement. One option that could prove more workable under a 
production ban agreement involves safeguards, which would closely 
follow the spirit of a CBM.25 A commitment to safeguards would 
involve three primary procedures: 
1) nuclear material accounting, involving quantities of nuclear 
material present and changes in inventory; 
2) containment and surveillance measures, restricting or 
controlling access to, or movement of, fissile material; and 
3) inspections, whether on-site (OSI) or by other means. 
In sum, the verification/safeguards issue as it pertains to a 
production ban may be demarcated in the following manner: 
1) the "wide scope" alternative, applying safeguards to all 
nuclear facilities and materials in the NWS and UNWS. The two 
primary issues for consideration here are: 
i) how this might achieve a degree of consensus at the CD; and 
ii) how the IAEA might meet these comprehensive require-
ments (possible model - IAEA INFCIRC/153). 
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2) The "limited scope" alternative - less effective but politically 
malleable - where verification/safeguards are applied only to 
those facilities and nuclear materials of greatest proliferation risk: 
enrichment and reprocessing facilities involving plutonium and 
HEU, but not LEU (possible model - IAEA INFCIRC/66). 
Linking these to the existing IAEA/Brookhaven analyses, "wide scope" 
is most closely related to the "comprehensive" category, while "limited 
scope" pertains to the "restricted" and "narrow" categories. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Among the more striking conclusions of this project is something on 
which the two existing studies agree. By far the greatest single factor in 
any estimate of routine inspection costs associated with verifying a 
fissile materials production cutoff is the number of operational 
reprocessing plants. Reprocessing plants account for 34-53 per cent of 
Cserveny's PDI estimates and about half of the Fishbone-Sanborn PDI 
estimates.26 This is true whether the verification system is limited or 
comprehensive. It thus follows that, regardless of the choice of 
verification system, a very large cost factor in verifying the cutoff would 
simply be the number of reprocessing facilities to be safeguarded. 
This highlights a related issue: the costs associated with a 
plutonium economy. If the use of plutonium (that is, production in 
reprocessors and use in MOX fuel) is limited or even reduced, the 
costs associated with the cutoff could fall very substantially. If, 
however, plutonium use were to rise, at least in the eight states 
covered in the estimates, the cost of verifying the cutoff would also 
increase appreciably. 
The two studies are of value as much for the questions they raise 
as for the answers they try to provide, and for what they exclude as 
much as for what they include. A close examination of each and a 
comparison of the two raise a number of issues that would need 
additional information and more detail concerning their calculations to 
resolve. Absent further information along the lines noted below, the 
estimates provided in the two studies are ambiguous rather than firm, 
and are not necessarily reliable guides to routine verification costs of a 
verifying international agency, much less to the total cost to all actors 
of a verifying cutoff treaty. The ambiguity originates in the following: 
1) which verifying activities and associated actors are not 
included in the studies' estimates; 
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2) problems associated with the use of PDI and $/PDI as a base 
for calculations; 
3) assumptions concerning the extent of the use of plutonium and 
HEU under a cutoff regime; 
4) the question of grandfathered civilian stocks of plutonium and 
HEU; and 
5) the possible operation of other factors that could affect the 
burden and the cost of verification that an international agency 
would be responsible for. 
The two studies refer only to routine verification costs by an 
international agency. They therefore omit other verification costs (for 
example, non-routine inspections; devising inspection strategies for 
specific facilities; and acquiring, placing, and maintaining equipment) 
faced by such an agency, and they ignore verification-related costs that 
might be paid by other actors, such as SSACs and facility operators. 
In addition, the use of PDI and PDI-based figures entails a number 
of problems. First, the reported PDI produced is not broken down by 
inspection activity, thus associating this simply with routine inspection 
is misleading. Second, the amount of PDI produced per year can vary 
considerably. Third, the use of $/PDI to generate a basis for verification 
estimates is not satisfactory. Aside from ambiguity about what the 
Safeguards Department's PDI figures cover in inspection activity and 
their variability from year to year, the $/PDI figure itself can vary 
substantially on a yearly basis. Fourth, the PDI requirements for routine 
verification of a facility of any given type are either ambiguous or not 
given at all. Fifth, the two studies vary quite substantially in their PDI 
estimates for various classes of facilities, even if some allowance is 
made for differences among paired options in the sorts of facilities 
included and the degree or standard of verification. This is particularly 
striking for PDI estimated for reprocessing. 
Estimates are quite sensitive to assumptions about the number, 
type, and operational status of facilities to be covered. Reprocessing 
facilities in particular absorb a very large portion of the estimated 
verification effort, while enrichment facilities, HEU and plutonium 
conversion facilities, and their fuel fabrication are also important. Any 
"hard" estimate of routine inspection costs must thus be founded on 
reasonably "hard" estimates of the extent of actual production and use 
of plutonium and HEU within the bounds of a cutoff regime. If HEU 
production and use is cut back, the associated verification load will be 
reduced. If plutonium production facilities (production reactors, 
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reprocessing, conversion, etc.) are cut back under a cutoff, the load on 
a verification system will also be substantially reduced. Conversely, if 
a civilian plutonium economy should develop under the cutoff, the 
verification load would increase. A first step in devising a tighter 
estimate would therefore be to list in greater detail the specific facilities 
(not just facility types) that would be affected under a cutoff, their 
assumed operational status, and the associated verification burden. 
Related to this is the "grandfathering" issue. If existing civilian 
stocks are exempted from verification and if they are widely used, the 
option of a "comprehensive" verification system along the lines of 
INFCIRC/153 makes no immediate sense. Instead, facilities associated 
with the exempted material would themselves not be safeguarded 
while that material was in them - an INFCIRC/66-style situation. Only 
as the exempted stocks were used up over time could a truly 
"comprehensive" system of verification be put in place. 
Various other factors could affect the extent of the burden and the 
cost an international agency would incur to implement such a 
verification system. These include: 
1) the effects of a New Partnership Arrangement between 
EURATOM and the IAEA, since many affected facilities would be 
within the European Union; 
2) the possible inclusion of some facilities in threshold states 
which may be currently under INFCIRC/66 safeguards; 
3) the possible effects of the IAEA's "93+2" programme for 
strengthening its safeguards; and 
4) possible measures to increase the efficiency of how inspectors 
are used. 
Verifying a production cutoff treaty will represent the single most 
crucial element for a cutoff regime. Given this level of importance, it is 
essential that a clear and comprehensive understanding be accorded to 
the matter of verification costs and to the issues that will contribute to 
them. Existing analyses of verification costs are incomplete and 
ambiguous. This is particularly serious in light of the attention given to 
the studies as a foundation for verification costs; clearly, our research 
shows that these costs are inaccurate. This report benefits those 
interested in establishing a verification programme by detailing and 
exploring the primary concerns that will directly affect costs and by 
providing a critical review of some existing proposals. To that end, this 
project contributes to our general understanding of the panoply of 
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verification issues, and also acts as something of a "caution" for those 
charged with the task of launching what will serve to be an immensely 
important contribution to non-proliferation and global security. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This paper examines the situation in current international 
maritime law regarding the possible interdiction of shipments by 
sea of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or of WMD-related 
items. Using the Proliferation Security Initiative's (PSI) "Statement of 
Interdiction Principles" as its starting point, it poses three questions: 
1. What are the possibilities and difficulties under existing 
international maritime law and under relevant national 
legislation for the interdiction of WMD-related shipments? 
2. What are the possibilities for strengthening the applicability of 
existing international and national laws, for example, through 
improved co-operation among states? 
3. In what areas might it be necessary or desirable to develop 
additional international legal instruments to deal with 
complexities or to fill gaps in the existing legal system; what 
might be the means of doing so; and what possible implications 
might this have for other international norms in the field of non-
proliferation, arms control, and disarmament (NACD)? 
The first issue is examined in the paper's second and third sections in 
relation to two sets of jurisdictional zones under the Law of the Sea: the 
territorial sea and beyond, and the internal waters of a coastal state. 
The second and third issues are dealt with in the last section of the 
paper. The overall problem is approached in terms of three basic tasks 
and four basic cases. 
Particulars of First Publication: 
2004. Research Report for the International Security Research and 
Outreach Program, Compliance and Verification Working Group, 
Department of Foreign Affairs. Available online from <http://www. dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/arms/isrop/research/keeley_2004/psi_wmd_keeley.pdf>. 
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The tasks are: 
1. obtaining accurate supply chain knowledge: that is, knowing 
who is shipping what to whom, and where, and where those 
goods might be at any given time; 
2. ensuring supply chain integrity: that is, making sure that the 
appropriate goods are moved to the appropriate destination and 
end-user via the appropriate route; 
3. being able to interrupt the supply chain as required. 
The cases are: 
1. cargo of concern being moved overtly; 
2. "Trojan Horse" cargo, in which some deception is being 
employed regarding the nature of the cargo, the intended route, 
the intended end use, and/or the intended end-user. The 
exporting firm, exporting state, and/or carrier, etc., may or may 
not be party to this deception; 
3. cargo tampering - diversion: that is, when an otherwise overt 
and legitimate cargo is diverted at some point along the supply 
chain. This may or may not involve the shipper, the receiver, 
forwarding agents, etc.; 
4. cargo tampering - smuggling: that is, an otherwise overt and 
legitimate cargo is illicitly opened in order to insert an item for 
covert delivery to a party further along the supply chain or a 
weapon/device is inserted for detonati on/release further along 
the supply chain. 
In the territorial sea and beyond, the rights of flag states over their 
own vessels are not particularly problematic. They may exercise 
jurisdiction over these vessels (in some cases concurrently with other 
states). They may board these vessels and consent to their boarding by 
others. Where the PSI Principles also call on states not to permit their 
nationals to assist in the transport of WMD-related cargoes, this is also 
not problematic: states have jurisdiction over the activities of their 
nationals, even abroad, and also over the activities of aliens within their 
territory. This can extend state law to cover owners of non-flag vessels' 
activities, for example. The rights of non-coastal states against foreign 
vessels are much more limited. The legal power of non-flag warships to 
stop and board other vessels is quite limited in favour of the general 
principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction on the high seas. Exceptions 
exist in time of war, under United Nations mandate, and for certain 
offences, but not merely on suspicion of carrying a WMD-related cargo. 
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Fish resources conservation conventions may give rights to states parties 
to board the vessels of non-parties in case of non-compliance, but no 
similar provisions are found in the three major WMD non-proliferation 
conventions (the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], the Chemical Weapons 
Convention [CWC], and the Biological Weapons Convention [BWC]), or 
in the various nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. Coastal states may 
have rights with respect to violations of rules within specific zones of 
their territorial seas, but these are limited in the Law of the Sea by the 
principle of innocent passage and by the rules governing transit rights in 
international straits. The Law of the Sea does contain provisions 
governing nuclear-powered vessels and vessels carrying nuclear and 
other inherently dangerous and noxious substances, but these 
provisions do not include a general right to interdict. Some leverage 
over such vessels could possibly be gained through the Basel 
Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes or 
perhaps by implementing other rules governing dangerous cargoes, if 
the items of concern here overlapped with lists of WMD-related items. 
The Basel Convention creates a system of prior notifications and 
permissions for exporting, importing, and transit states. 
In the internal waters of states, the international legal situation is 
far more favourable to interdiction, since foreign merchant vessels 
entering a port subject themselves to the laws of that state (the flag state 
may have concurrent jurisdiction). Port states may deny permission to 
enter and may also place conditions upon entry. The Americans have 
made extensive use of this in their Container Security Initiative, among 
other things, by requiring containers to be screened at foreign ports 
before entering the United States. A generalization of this system 
combined with the development of broader export-import and transit 
regulations, could give a port state (whether the state be transit or 
transshipment, exporting or importing) extensive information about 
cargoes and extensive powers to inspect and interdict. These sorts of 
powers could be linked to broader efforts in international maritime 
trade to strengthen the management of the supply chain, especially for 
containerized traffic at sea, and to increase knowledge of actors, 
cargoes, and activities throughout that supply chain. 
With respect to improved coordination in the use of existing legal 
instruments, a primary example would be the development of 
coordinated consent provisions for foreign boarding, of the sort that 
the United States recently signed with Liberia. Such agreements, if 
generalized beyond the purely bilateral, could go far in addressing the 
inherent fragmentation of jurisdiction on the high seas created by the 
basic rule of exclusive flag state jurisdiction. 
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With respect to more general legal instruments to cut through this 
fragmentation, at least with respect to shipments of WMD-related 
items, there are several possible avenues of approach - for example, 
creating new conventions, amending existing conventions, passing 
United Nations Security Council resolutions, and seeking author-
ization from the relevant regional international organizations. A l l 
present problems, however. Both new and amended conventions 
would have to be negotiated, creating opportunities for bargaining and 
linkages to non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament 
obligations. The problem also arises that the existing major 
conventions (NPT, CWC, and BWC) all permit legitimate trade in 
possible WMD-related items. In addition, with respect to amending 
treaties, a party to the original treaty which did not consent to the 
amendment would not be automatically bound by it. Existing WMD 
non-proliferation treaties, while possessing or at least implying 
obligations on individual states to control the trade, do not explicitly 
authorize interdiction to block it. The Security Council route, if taken 
through a general resolution, would substantially alter an ancient and 
basic principle of the Law of the Sea regarding flag state jurisdiction, 
through the action of a small group of states. This would be politically 
(and possibly legally) very problematic. A more specifically targeted 
resolution - dealing with one state, for example - might be much more 
acceptable, but it would still need to be negotiated. Even if regional 
international organizations might have the power to authorize 
interdictions under certain circumstances, an appropriate and tractable 
organization might not always be available. 
On the other hand, legal authorities - and technical systems - based 
on port state rights and on trade management schemes seem to present 
far greater and less problematic possibilities. They may be presented as 
based on existing, already powerful, legal rights of port states, and as 
defending trade security. One might potentially look for the development 
of a "controlled trade" approach, with any cargoes not permitted under 
such an approch being illegal and subject to interception within a more 
developed system of cargo tracking and inspection. 
Finally, the role of national legislation cannot be ignored. This 
would cover not only the activities of state nationals, but also the 
activities of port states. 
Existing and potential legal authorities for interdiction present 
both problems and possibilities for other norms and obligations in 
existing non-proliferation agreements. An interdiction scheme, it must 
be emphasized, cannot effectively replace monitoring or pre-existing 
verification and safeguard mechanisms in the NPT, CWC, and BWC, 
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since it could not cover existing or indigenously developed capabilities 
within states. Focusing purely on trade, such a scheme might also create 
problems with respect to obligations in the three conventions regarding 
peaceful use, trade, and development. Furthermore, efforts either to 
amend these conventions directly or to seek broad legal authorities for 
interdiction elsewhere would readily invite linkages to other obligations 
with respect to these conventions. An approach by way of trade 
management, port state rights, and "controlled trade," however, might 
strengthen mechanisms to deal with both legitimate and covert trade. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The American-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)1 attempts to 
block the international movement of goods related to weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). Two sorts of potential producers or possessors of 
WMD are of concern: states and non-state actors. Questions have been 
raised, however, about the legal basis in international maritime law for 
the interception of such shipments. The United States has repeatedly 
stated that existing international and national laws provide authority 
for this, and that efforts might be made to develop further legal 
authorities.2 Using the PSI's "Statement of Interdiction Principles"3 as 
its starting point, this paper addresses three broad issues: 
1. What are the possibilities and difficulties under existing 
international maritime law and relevant national legislation for 
the interdiction of WMD-related shipments?4 
2. What are the possibilities for strengthening the applicability of 
existing international and national laws, for example, through 
improved co-operation among states? 
3. In what areas might it be necessary or desirable to develop 
additional international legal instruments to deal with 
complexities or to fill gaps in the existing legal system; What 
might be the means of doing so; and What would be some 
implications of this for other international norms in the field of 
non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament (NACD)? 
The basic body of relevant international law is the Law of the Sea. 
This paper uses the United Nations Third Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS III) as its primary source, as many of its relevant 
provisions, with some variation in detail, are based on customary 
international law and so would be binding even on states not party to 
the convention. Other international conventions bearing on the 
movement of goods by sea will also be drawn upon, owing to their 
applicability or because they may be of interest. 
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The Law of the Sea performs the basic function of assigning 
jurisdictions in maritime areas, primarily to flag states (states in which 
a vessel is registered) and coastal states. This assignment provides 
guidance as to where, with respect to what, and under what 
conditions a state may regulate and enforce its regulations, and with 
respect to whom. This assignment of competencies may also be 
combined with other, broader jurisdictional bases, notably state 
jurisdiction based on actions performed within its territory (whether 
or not by its nationals), jurisdiction based on nationality, and universal 
jurisdiction, under which any state might be able to apprehend an 
offender in certain circumstances. 
The first issue is examined in the second and third sections of this 
paper in relation to two sets of jurisdictional zones under the Law of the 
Sea: the territorial sea and beyond, and the internal waters of a coastal 
state. The second and third issues are addressed in the paper's fourth 
section. The overall problem to be dealt with is approached in terms of 
three basic tasks and four basic cases, all arising within the overall 
concept of an international maritime trade supply chain connecting the 
point of origin of a good with its ultimate destination, and possibly 
passing through one or more transit or transshipment ports. 
The tasks are: 
1. obtaining accurate supply chain knowledge: that is, knowing 
who is shipping what to whom, and where, and where those 
goods might be at any given time; 
2. ensuring supply chain integrity: that is, making sure that the 
appropriate goods are moved to the appropriate destination and 
end-user, via the appropriate route; 
3. being able to interrupt the supply chain as required;. 
4. the four basic cases cover the threat of acquisition of WMD-
related goods by a state or by a non-state actor, with the 
additional concern that the latter in particular might use cargoes 
and ships as weapons and delivery systems. 
The cases are: 
1. cargo of concern being moved overtly; 
2. "Trojan Horse" cargo, in which some deception is employed 
regarding the nature of the cargo, the intended route, the 
intended end use, and/or the intended end-user. The exporting 
firm, exporting state, and/or carrier, etc., may or may not be party 
to this deception;6 
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3. cargo tampering - diversion: that is, when an otherwise overt 
and legitimate cargo is diverted at some point along the supply 
chain. This may or may not involve the help of the shipper, the 
receiver, forwarding agents, etc.; 
4. cargo tampering - smuggling: that is, an otherwise overt and 
legitimate cargo is illicitly opened in order to insert an item for 
covert delivery to a party further along the supply chain, or a 
weapon/device is inserted for detonation/release further along 
the supply chain. 
A final consideration should also be noted. Although schemes to 
interdict trade in WMD-related items may slow proliferation, they will not 
have a direct effect on the development of indigenous WMD capabilities. 
II. INTERDICTION IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND BEYOND 
Two fundamental rules of the Law of the Sea are freedom of 
navigation - any state's vessels may sail the high seas - and the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state (the state of registry) on the high 
seas. Even within other maritime zones outside of a state's internal 
waters, the Law of the Sea is strongly concerned with promoting and 
protecting the right of navigation free from non-flag state interference. 
For our purposes, therefore, three types of cases arise in the territorial 
sea and beyond:7 
1. the rights of a state over its own vessels (and also over its 
nationals even beyond its territory and the acts of all persons 
within its territory); 
2. the rights of warships of one state to stop, board, search, or 
even seize foreign-flag vessels on the high seas or beyond the 
territorial sea; 
3. the rights of coastal states to stop, board, search, or even seize 
foreign-flagged vessels within their coastal maritime zones. 
The first case is relatively unproblematic. The second presents 
fundamental difficulties save under very specific circumstances. The 
third presents both some possibilities and some limitations. 
STATES AND THEIR OWN VESSELS 
The PSI interdiction principles call on states not to assist in the 
transport of WMD-related cargoes or permit their nationals to do so, 




states that may permit it to stop their vessels in order to combat the 
narcotics trade and illegal immigration. In its campaign against the 
slave trade in the nineteenth century Britain reached agreements with 
various states granting mutual rights of search. The United States has 
recently reached a PSI-related boarding agreement with Liberia,12 
while the British Foreign Secretary has noted that such agreements 
with the ten most important flag states would cover about 70 per cent 
of maritime trade.13 In UNCLOS III, for the purposes of fighting the 
narcotics traffic and under the narcotics conventions, flag states are 
supposed to co-operate with others to suppress this traffic. This may 
include granting permission to board when it is requested. Who 
precisely must grant permission - the master of the vessel or the state 
of registry, etc. - may vary in national legislation. 
The PSI principles do not call for the interdiction on the high seas 
of foreign-flagged vessels without the consent of the state of registry. 
This constitutes a very significant gap in the ability to interdict along 
the supply chain. However, under certain circumstances, a warship of 
one state may be able to intercept a vessel flagged to another state. In 
time of war, belligerents may attack each others' merchant vessels 
anywhere outside of the internal and territorial waters of neutral 
states, and also neutral shipping under some circumstances. 14 
Interdictions may also be conducted under a Security Council 
mandate. Some Security Council anti-terrorism resolutions may give 
rights of interdiction, as may arms embargoes and the like. 
Other than in these circumstances, the Law of the Sea does permit 
a warship of one state to stop and board a foreign vessel in certain 
cases (the "right of visit"): if it suspects the other vessel is engaged in 
piracy, the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, is really of the same 
nationality though showing a different flag, or is of no nationality. If 
the other vessel is suspected of narcotics trafficking, its flag state may 
request the co-operation of others to suppress the traffic. No 
international rule, however, seems to permit the stopping, etc., of 
foreign vessels on grounds of suspicion of participation in the WMD-
related trade. Claims of self-defence would likely be very limited in 
applicability, while arguments based on the January 1992 Security 
Council Presidential Statement would be mistaken.15 Nothing would 
stop a flag state, however, from consenting to boarding by another. 
Under rules governing arrangements to implement conservation 
measures for certain fish stocks, it is also possible for states not party 
to such an arrangement to have their vessels boarded by states parties 
in cases of possible non-compliance.16 No such provisions, however, 
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are found in or derived from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, or the Biological Weapons 
Convention. Nor are analogous provisions found in the various 
nuclear-weapon-free zones conventions.17 The parties to these latter 
agreements do not claim a right to block transit in maritime areas by 
nuclear-armed vessels, much less by commercial vessels carrying 
nuclear-related cargoes. Instead, while the states parties are free to 
refuse entry into their ports and other internal waters to such vessels, 
passage is otherwise governed by the more general Law of the Sea. 
RIGHTS OF COASTAL STATES 
The PSFs interdiction principles call on states to stop and search 
vessels in their territorial seas and contiguous zones. Under certain 
circumstances, a coastal state may arrest a foreign-flagged vessel. If 
that vessel is breaking certain rules under UNCLOS III in respect to a 
particular zone, the coastal state may be able to arrest it and even 
pursue it into the high seas (though not into another state's territorial 
sea) and arrest it there-the "right of hot pursuit" (Article 111). For 
example, a coastal state would be able to arrest foreign vessels engaged 
in smuggling within its contiguous zone or territorial sea and to 
engage in appropriate hot pursuit if necessary. Similar possibilities 
would exist for the exclusive economic zone for relevant rules there. 
Coastal states have sovereignty over their territorial seas and can 
take various measures to regulate navigation, but the right of innocent 
passage limits their jurisdiction over foreign vessels - including 
warships - within their territorial seas, especially if such a vessel does 
not call at a port in the coastal state. This right can only be temporarily 
suspended, and only on a non-discriminatory basis, in the territorial 
sea. It cannot be suspended in international straits. Although passage, 
to be considered innocent, should "not prejudice ... the peace, good 
order or security of the coastal State,"18 the activities which would be 
considered prejudicial are apparently exhaustively defined in Article 
19.2; the nature of the cargo is itself not sufficient. If innocent passage 
covers foreign warships potentially armed with WMD, why should it 
not also permit commercial vessels carrying merely WMD-related 
goods? Indeed, the interpretation placed on this article by the United 
States and the Soviet Union supports such a reading. " 
Article 23 of UNCLOS III does require that "foreign nuclear-
powered vessels and vessels carrying nuclear or other inherently 
dangerous or noxious substances" should carry appropriate 
documents and observe special precautions. This might have a bearing 
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"officially" part of the PSI or those merely indicating general support 
for it - the hardest case would be that of a foreign-flagged vessel for 
which permission to board was denied. This could cover any of the 
four cases, but especially could be a problem for the cargo carried 
overtly by a foreign-flag vessel which was not even indirectly subject 
to pressure - such as the case of a ship-owner of a different nationality 
than the ship's state of registry.24 
One limitation of a focus on interdiction in the territorial sea or 
beyond, however, is precisely that it leaves aside the two other tasks 
noted in the introduction: obtaining appropriate supply chain 
knowledge and ensuring supply chain integrity. At the same time, an 
effective interdiction strategy - wherever pursued - requires the 
successful performance of these two other tasks. 
III. INTERDICTION IN PORT STATES 
The PSI Interdiction Principles call on port states to stop and search 
suspect vessels in their internal waters and to enforce appropriate 
conditions on suspect vessels entering or leaving their internal waters. 
It also calls on port states to prevent their facilities from being used as 
transshipment points for WMD-related cargoes. 
The rights of states over their internal waters, including their 
ports, are very substantial in international law. With relatively minor 
exceptions, there is no right of innocent passage in internal waters. 
Moreover, a port state is free in most cases to deny entry to any vessel 
if it so chooses. While foreign warships are, of course, immune to 
assertion of local jurisdiction, foreign commercial vessels clearly come 
under local jurisdiction once they enter a coastal state's internal 
waters; at best, the flag state might have concurrent jurisdiction. 
Malanczuk thus concludes that "broadly speaking, the coastal state 
may apply and enforce its laws in full against foreign merchant ships 
in its internal waters."25 
On this basis, port states may create a variety of requirements and 
regulations to govern trade entering and leaving their ports. While this 
might be seen to threaten trade, the strong role of a relatively small 
number of very important port states helps to simplify this problem, 
assuming these states can agree amongst themselves. In addition, and 
as a stimulus to co-operation, states are increasingly aware not only of 
terrorism as a threat to trade (if for example, shipping is attacked or 
ports are attacked), but also that there may be a threat from trade, if 
merchant vessels were to become delivery systems for a terrorist 





MULTILATERAL SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
Various efforts are underway both formally and informally bilaterally, 
multilaterally, and through international organizations, to strengthen 
management of portions or all of the maritime supply chain. The 
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and 
Security, has developed various relevant programs of out-reach and co-
operation with foreign counterparts.37 Various meetings have been 
held to deal with the transshipment problem.38 Japan has hosted 
various seminars39 and has recently been reported to be about to sign 
an agreement with Singapore regarding transshipment.40 The 1998 
ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit 
provides, under Article 20, that "dangerous goods," as specified in a 
protocol, shall not be permitted transit transportation without a special 
permit of the transit state.41 Further information about the contents of 
that protocol (number 9) would be desirable. 
The World Customs Organization has also taken a strong interest 
in the problem of supply chain security and management,42 paying 
particular attention to the development of models and procedures for 
the global management of trade. The combination of a system for trade 
modelling, tracking, and information-sharing, the harmonization of 
customs processes, a consolidated list of WMD-related items of interest 
(based, probably on existing export control regime lists and the like), 
and legal authorities - whether PSI-related or on the basis of national 
legislation - to inspect and seize cargoes and vessels would go a very 
long way towards addressing all three tasks and all four cases noted in 
the introduction of this paper. 
SUMMARY 
As compared to the interdiction problem in the territorial sea of a 
coastal state and beyond, the possibilities for interdiction - and for 
other and broader-scope control efforts - are much greater within the 
internal waters of states. States' legal authority within their internal 
waters is much stronger, though the requisite national legislation to 
assert it may need to be developed. Substantial efforts are underway 
both unilaterally and multilaterally to develop mechanisms to track 
and to obtain information about cargoes and to develop methods of 
inspection. As long as a merchant vessel carrying WMD-related cargo 
calls at a port state in transit, or touches in at a port in the destination 
state of the cargo if it is smuggling, interdiction is possible. The 




PSI states - would continue. Inevitably, some states would refuse, and 
these hardest cases would have to be dealt with some other way. 
Available public reports suggest that PSI members are presently 
still examining their various legal authorities. These reports also 
suggest that no boarding agreement has as yet been reached among PSI 
states.44 No public information discovered in the course of this research 
indicated either the precise nature of the boarding agreements being 
sought, or the nature of any difficulties in reaching it. One might 
anticipate, however, some variation among states in their 
interpretation of their legal rights (and thus in what rights they are 
willing to concede to others), as well as some possible variance in their 
national legislation and regulations (and similar difficulties, perhaps, 
with each other's legislation) which might prove difficult. 
"MAGIC BULLETS" 
An apparently attractive mechanism to overcome especially the consent 
problem (other than by negotiating consent agreements) is to prohibit 
the WMD-related trade at the international level in a way that could 
authorize even boarding without flag-state permission - along the lines 
of rules dealing with piracy or the slave trade. Various possibilities could 
exist here, in either the creation of new international conventions or the 
amendment of existing conventions. Other possibilities suggested 
include obtaining a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution, 
or claiming legal authority on the basis of prior Security Council 
statements or on the basis of endorsement by an appropriate regional 
organization. One final possible argument would be to claim a self-
defence exception under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Some 
of these have merit, but all present difficulties, and some seem to be 
unlikely as legal authorities in most applicable circumstances. 
One potential route would be either to create a new treaty 
outlawing the trade in WMD-related items and permitting boarding, 
etc., on the high seas - perhaps under universal jurisdiction - and in 
territorial seas by the coastal state. The precise specification of such a 
treaty could be fairly complex: exactly what items would be covered? 
How would such a list be updated? Would some trade be regarded as 
legitimate? What information would be regarded as justification for a 
boarding? Who would actually carry out the boarding? and so on. In 
addition, one could anticipate such a treaty, aside from being difficult 
to negotiate both in its own right and in relation to the Law of the Sea, 
potentially becoming linked very readily to quids pro quo in the 
disarmament and other fields. Progress here could readily be held 
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hostage to progress in other areas (for example, Article VI of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty), whether these areas were in the broad NACD 
field or not. 
Amending an existing treaty could present similar difficulties. An 
effort is currently underway to add a number of new offenses to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (SUA). These primarily focus on activities on 
board or threatening to a vessel, but two of them focus on the use of 
vessels to transport substances to be used for weapons of mass 
destruction. Such amendments would eventually be raised at a future 
diplomatic conference.45 While an amendment strategy could avoid 
some of the difficulties of starting from the first step, two 
disadvantages are also apparent. First, such conventions have 
amending formulas: in the case of SUA, an amending conference may 
be requested by ten states parties or one-third of the membership, 
whichever is the higher number, and presumably would have to be 
accepted by a majority. Second, a party which does not consent to the 
amendment would not be bound by it.46 
A similar idea would be to amend the relevant NACD treaties -
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -
to try to provide specific authority for interdiction. No treaty covers 
the case of ballistic missiles, only a multilateral export control regime. 
None of these provide strong support for an interpretation that they 
authorize interdiction (as opposed to the exercise of export controls) in 
support of their objectives. Such an interdiction possibility may be 
desirable, of course, but that does not mean that the provisions of these 
treaties may be understood to include it already. 
The NPT has provisions requiring safeguards (Article III) and 
upholding "the inalienable right" to use nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes (Article IV). Although non-nuclear weapons states agree not 
to receive, acquire, or produce nuclear explosives, and nuclear 
weapons states agree not to transfer nuclear weapons to others 
(Articles I and II), there are no other provisions that particularly bear 
on trade or that support interdiction. The Zangger Committee, which 
operates in terms of Article III, covers safeguarding requirements. The 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which has in the past been a vehicle 
to deny the supply of certain technologies, is a multilateral export 
control regime; it claims no right of interdiction beyond those 
possibilities found in national export control legislation. 
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The BWC includes an undertaking not to transfer to and not to 
assist others (Article III); however, under Article X it also states a right 
of peaceful uses and calls for exchanges and for the implementation of 
the convention in a way that does not hamper the economic or 
technological development of states parties. While parties are to adopt 
the national legislation necessary to implement the convention, there is 
no provision for interdiction other than through national means. The 
Australia Group, like the NSG, may try to control exports, but with 
similar limitations. 
The CWC again prohibits the direct or indirect transfer of 
chemical weapons (Article I). It permits states to acquire toxic 
chemicals for non-prohibited purposes, and like the BWC, ensures that 
the economic and technological development of states should not be 
hampered (Articles VI, XI). It is more explicit in its requirements for 
national legislation (Article VII). It does have verification provisions 
covering permitted transfers to non-party states (Annex on 
Implementation and Verification, Part VII.C and Part VIII.C). Again, 
however, nothing specifically permits interdiction of the sort 
contemplated under the PSI. 
Both the possibilities and the problems of amendment would 
exist for all of these conventions. Again, one could expect bargaining 
for quids pro quo, which could complicate both an effort to gain 
explicit interdiction authority and progress on other issues regarding 
these conventions. Additionally, there would be strains in reconciling 
the attempt to insert provisions permitting interdiction with existing 
requirements supporting peaceful trade and use. 
The UNSC route could be superficially attractive on the basis that 
such resolutions under chapter 7 of the Charter are binding on United 
Nations member states, and the Charter overrides other international 
treaties in this regard.47 Seeking a blanket resolution of this sort, 
however, poses some substantial political difficulties. The rules that 
would be overridden - the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state on the 
high seas and the concept of innocent passage - are so central to the 
Law of the Sea and so long-standing that one inevitable outcome even 
of the attempt (much less a successful attempt) would be to raise the 
question of the status of the UNSC - a body of fifteen states - as a 
creator of international law. Political protest, and perhaps even an 
attempt to bring the issue to the International Court of Justice, could 
follow. If such a resolution was sought on a case-by-case basis, this 
difficulty might be avoided. However, each such resolution would 
need to be negotiated in the Council, with attendant bargaining and 
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loss of time. Issues such as the duration of such a resolution, and the 
circumstances under which it might be lifted, of who would do the 
intercepting and on what basis, etc., would likely have to be addressed. 
While examples exist of such resolutions, even such a relatively limited 
authority might be difficult to obtain in a timely and workable way. It 
is interesting that available public reports about the draft United States 
resolution before the UNSC suggest that it wishes states to criminalize 
WMD-related activities in their national legislation, but not that it 
would do so at the international level.48 
Authorization by a regional organization is yet another route. 
Possibly this has the Cuban Missile Crisis in mind, in which a resolution 
approving the "quarantine" of Cuba was adopted by the Organization 
of American States and was argued to fall under chapter 8 of the United 
Nations Charter.49 Leaving aside the question of whether such an 
argument is valid, an appropriate and tractable regional organization 
might not always be available. Similarly, adopting an approach such as 
in the fish stocks convention would require an appropriate 
organization. While the various nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties 
could be a nucleus for this in the case of nuclear weapons and a source 
for zones aimed at other weapons (or more general WMD-free zones), 
their reluctance to assert such rights now in addition to the difficulties 
which nuclear-weapon states would have in accepting these rights as 
applied to their own warships should give us pause. As is the case for 
the territorial sea, if the passage by a WMD-armed vessel is deemed 
acceptable in law, on what basis could the passage of a merchant vessel 
carrying WMD-related items be intercepted? 
Another possible UNSC reference has been suggested as a basis 
for interdiction - the January 1992 Presidential Statement - but this 
seems a weak reed. A mere presidential statement, particularly one 
couched in very general terms, could not provide legal authority for 
the claim of the right in question, given above all the ancient and 
fundamental rights to the contrary in the Law of the Sea. 
Self-defence under the United Nations Charter is similarly 
unlikely - at least in most probable circumstances. If the presence of a 
foreign NBC-armed warship in one's territorial sea without prior 
notice or authorization is not necessarily a threat to one's security or a 
violation of innocent passage, it is hard to see how a shipment of 
WMD-related items on a merchant vessel, possibly far from one's 
shores and possibly to a destination far from one's territory, could meet 
the requirements of a self-defence claim. The case of a terrorist 
shipment destined for one's port would be more likely, however. 
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N ETWORK-BASED CONTROL 
All three of the WMD conventions are also committed to allowing trade 
in many items, some dual-use. This would have to be carried over, 
perhaps into a scheme for the development of a controlled trade. With 
respect to that possibility, both the Basel Convention on Hazardous 
Wastes - with its debated relationship to innocent passage - and the 
narcotics control conventions could conceivably serve as models. 
Under the Basel Convention, exporting states are to inform in 
advance both the destination state and any transit state concerned of 
the movements of hazardous wastes; these, in turn, may either consent 
or deny permission, or seek additional information. The trade in a 
consolidated list of special-purpose and dual-use items drawn from 
existing WMD-related lists could possibly be subjected to a similar 
regime of notifications and permissions, with the added proviso that 
vessels could be inspected to assure compliance, and that any items not 
duly notified in advance and receiving permission would be deemed 
ipso facto illegal transfers and subject to seizure. 
In the case of the various narcotics and related conventions, there 
are provisions for trading under license, including through trans-
shipment or transit states.50 The 1988 United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
outlines detailed steps available to states to combat that traffic, 
including criminalization of involvement through "brokering, 
dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport" (Article 3) by actors under 
their jurisdiction, including commercial carriers (Articles 4, 15). It 
provides for assistance to transit states (Article 10) and application to 
free trade zones and free ports (Article 18). It permits a controlled 
trade, building on the earlier conventions (Article 16). Article 17 
explicitly covers interdiction at sea, but only with the permission of the 
flag state of the suspect vessel. 
For both of these possibilities, however, the actual effectiveness of 
their measures would need to be considered. In the case of narcotics, 
for example, one might keep in mind the caustic observation that "it is 
sometimes said that the easiest way to bring nuclear material into the 
United States would be to hide it in a bale of marijuana."51 
Other possibilities could exist based on efforts to regulate the trade 
in toxic chemicals. These have included the development of consolidated 
lists, adoption of guidelines by UNEP, regulation by the European 
Union, and other efforts. Such a system might be adaptable not only to 
the requirements of the CWC but also to the other WMD conventions.52 
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Efforts under the International Maritime Organization to 
increase security both on ships and at ports (the International Ship 
and Port Facility Security Code) may also be relevant, not only with 
respect to port authorities' powers with respect to ships but also as 
bearing on efforts to deal with smuggling possibilities by crew or 
shore-based personnel. 
Using the supply chain concept and seeing trade as an activity 
involving the movement of goods through a network connecting 
various points (including port of origin, transit or transshipment state, 
and port of destination), a network approach seeks to manage the 
entire network. It therefore addresses all three identified tasks and can 
supplement interception in ports with interception at sea under one or 
the other of the first two approaches. The coordination problem is still 
considerable, but systematic efforts to resolve it are underway, as noted 
in the previous section of this paper. 
An approach to control based on port states' rights under 
international law and the Law of the Sea thus seems prima facie to 
present certain great advantages over one which focuses above all on 
interdiction in the territorial sea and beyond: 
1. Instead of potentially attacking the fundamental principle of 
flag state jurisdiction - while still leaving a very large gap on the 
high seas - it draws on well-established and powerful coastal 
state authority for potential assessment and interception of 
cargoes where that authority is well-established. It is thus better 
able to address the four cases noted in the introduction. 
2. It presents itself as a facilitator of trade rather than as a basic 
challenge to the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction and 
engages state interest positively not negatively. It may still, of 
course, be combined with interdiction at sea. 
3. It directs attention to the network of trade in terms of the 
movement of vessels and cargoes between nodes in that network. It 
thus more fully addresses the three tasks noted in the introduction. 
4. It draws upon existing as well as developing networks of co-
operation among export control systems, international organi-
zations, and customs officers and other local authorities. 
While there are numerous challenges to be met in building on 
these strengths, the ultimate advantage is that they seem to be working 
with possibilities in both international and domestic law, rather than 
against existing law. In the words of one analyst, 
76 
JAMES KEELEY 
At the end of the day, there is an extraordinary opportunity for 
real overlap between the homeland-security imperative to 
transform conventional border-management practices and the 
goal of the nonproliferation community of preventing the spread 
of weapons of mass destruction.53 
NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
Appropriate national legislation, as noted above, may be required in 
some NACD treaties, at least as far as a state party's nationals (and 
aliens on its territory) may be required. This requirement, however, 
seems much honoured in the breach. It is therefore unlikely that 
merely adding yet another international requirement for such 
legislation would be particularly useful. It would seem far better to 
pursue the fulfillment, and possible improvement, of existing NACD 
obligations of this type. Multilateral export control regimes could also 
present an avenue for such efforts - or at least for "harmonizing" 
national export control regimes around something other than a lowest 
common denominator. 
Aside from covering activities by nationals (and aliens on one's 
territory), desirable national legislation should also cover the transfer, 
directly or indirectly, of WMD-related materials without a license, and 
should also cover such activities as brokering and such actors in the 
supply chain as shippers or ship-owners which come under national 
jurisdiction. In some cases at least, ship-owners have apparently been 
approached by their national governments to divert suspect vessels to 
ports where their cargoes could be checked. For those companies 
which do not co-operate or which otherwise participate in the trade, 
the British Foreign Secretary's suggestion that shipping lines could be 
denied port privileges - a penalty that would be applicable to foreign 
vessels - could be useful, and is well within a port state's current 
international legal authority. The Hong Kong approach of involving 
shippers in the documentation chain - in effect, to enlist them in 
verifying the existence of appropriate export and import licenses - is 
also of interest. In any case, having some ability to acquire knowledge 
about and to control - even for the transit trade or transshipment -
what cargoes are entering or leaving one's ports (for example, along 
the lines of Australia's regulations or Hong Kong's) would seem highly 
desirable. In this way, even if a shipment was legitimate in the law of 
the exporting state, it might prove difficult for a carrier to take it to its 
destination, either openly if it has to avoid touching at ports where the 
cargo would be open to seizure, or covertly if discrepancies in 
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documentation or other information could indicate grounds for 
legitimate search by port authorities. 
One clear requirement of this, however, is a coherent and 
reasonably exhaustive list of items which would have to be reported 
and which would be either controlled or banned. Such a list -
essentially a compendium across all the WMD fields, one which would 
need to include dual-use items and ballistic missile items - would have 
to be consistent across states as well. An additional requirement that 
would be highly desirable would be adequate end-use and end-user 
verification on the part of exporter states. This requirement does not 
seem to be a part of all the multilateral export control regimes. Even 
where required, whether by national controls or by a multilateral 
system, the state of this seems to be quite inadequate.54 Bringing both 
national and multilateral regimes up to the mark in this respect could 
be a considerable undertaking. 
A final and crucial requirement, of course, would be adequate 
mechanisms for the timely development and sharing of intelligence 
among states, and for providing it to those specific states (whether 
port states or because of their naval dispositions on the high seas) 
which would be best able to act upon it in accordance with 
international and national law. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR EXISTING WMD NON-PROLIFERATION TREATIES 
Plans to interdict WMD-related shipments in maritime trade cannot 
substitute for or replace the three major existing conventions - the 
NPT, CWC, or BWC. An interdiction scheme cannot deal with existing 
facilities or the indigenous development of capabilities; it also lacks the 
monitoring, verification, and safeguarding mechanisms generated 
under those treaties. Interdiction schemes can provide a useful 
supplement to, and development of, mechanisms intended to check 
WMD proliferation, however, in tandem with existing - or improved -
multilateral and national export control mechanisms. In particular, 
they may help to build on obligations for national control legislation, 
assuming that such obligations are met. This can be done not simply by 
criminalizing activities in defiance of national obligations under these 
treaties but also by extending national and international control and 
co-operation more effectively into the actual supply chain and into the 
actual movement of WMD-related goods. 
Attempts to create ambitious international legal authorities for 
interdiction, especially on the high seas, by creating new treaties, 
amending existing treaties, or relying on UN Security Council 
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resolutions could fill an existing major gap caused by fundamental 
rules of the Law of the Sea. However, such moves would also present 
political and legal difficulties, not only in technical and legal details 
concerning processes of amendment or the rights of states parties not 
agreeing to amendments, for example, but also in the political 
bargaining that would readily accompany such a set of approaches. 
Some of this could create undesirable linkages with respect to existing 
WMD non-proliferation treaties. In the case of Security Council 
resolutions, the prospect of a limited group of states creating sweeping 
new law overriding well-established and widely accepted flag state 
rights on the high seas and in territorial seas would undoubtedly cause 
considerable concern. 
As the histories of the various multilateral export control regimes 
suggest, efforts to develop interdiction mechanisms could be seen as an 
attack on peaceful use, trade, and development rights recognized in the 
WMD non-proliferation treaties. A more positive approach linking 
interdiction to trade security concerns could build upon both strong port 
state rights in international law and developing measures to provide both 
port state security against terrorist attacks and upon stronger maritime 
supply chain monitoring and management systems. These could be 
linked to efforts to develop more of a "controlled trade" approach for 
permitted movements of WMD-related items (in keeping with trade and 
development clauses in the WMD non-proliferation treaties), while also 
providing greater leverage on covert trade in WMD-related items. 
SUMMARY 
Coordinated consent arrangements among states give leverage on the 
interdiction problem on the high seas as long as such consent is 
forthcoming in a timely manner. Interdiction in a territorial sea by a 
coastal state is a little different, since presumably, the coastal state is 
likely to do the interdicting. The legal basis for interdiction would be 
limited by the right of innocent passage, as noted in section II of this 
paper. Efforts to overcome the "high seas gap" created by the rule of 
exclusive flag-state jurisdiction could be based on a number of devices, 
but all could present potential dangers in addition to opportunities. 
They would, in general, be difficult in the sense of negotiating means 
to align them with the states' trade and development rights under 
existing NACD agreements. Building on port state authority, however, 
although technically daunting, seems less problematic on the 
international legal level, and would be at least potentially more 
complete in terms of the tasks and cases noted in the introduction. This 
could be linked to existing treaties on WMD proliferation through, for 
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example, non-transfer obligations and the development of appropriate 
national legislation. Were it portrayed as securing trade, moreover, it 
might strike a more positive note than would a focus purely on 
boarding. It could be carried out in a manner consistent with trade 
obligations under the three WMD treaties, perhaps in the manner of a 
controlled trade regime. Finally, of course, states would need to 
develop national legislation, both to provide leverage over activities of 
their nationals - including abroad - or to develop their potentials as 
port states regarding any WMD-related maritime traffic. 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of interdicting the flow of WMD-related items in maritime 
traffic raises a wide variety of legal issues. In some cases - flag states 
governing their own vessels and nationals or consenting to be boarded 
by others, or in the case of port states, developing and exercising their 
rights in their own internal waters - the basic legal issues do not present 
immense obstacles. The real issue would be developing the appropriate 
mechanisms and national authorities. Only the case of non-consent 
boarding on the high seas presents absolutely fundamental problems. 
While these could be overcome through various mechanisms -
including new treaties, amendment of existing treaties, resort to the 
Security Council, and so on - all would present fairly substantial legal 
and/or political problems as well, not least in trying to square them 
with trade-related obligations in the relevant WMD treaties. In 
particular, the development of port state rights already permitted under 
existing international law (through the adoption of appropriate 
national legislation) and the marrying of these to mechanisms to 
consolidate control lists, identify and track trade, harmonize customs 
requirements, and coordinate across states (including in customs 
processes), could have considerable potential, though the technical 
issues are significant. The result could be a system of controlled 
trade - though the model of the narcotics conventions may not be, 
under current circumstances, the happiest comparison. As noted, 
however, even success in this regard would leave the problem of the 
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reat and terrible events generate a variety of responses. Initially 
these may be largely expressive or even cathartic displays or 
X f c J emotional states: shock and horror, joy, feelings of solidarity or 
of distance, a desire for revenge or urgings of caution, casting about for 
blame or pleadings of innocence, and so on. But catharsis, however 
understandable as a human response, is a poor guide to understanding 
and a worse guide to policy. For these, we must turn to more analytical, 
if also more cold-blooded, consideration. 
In considering the American response to the events of 11 
September 2001, we are drawn into a complex mix of issues - of 
legality, political wisdom, military feasibility, and morality. Politics as 
a high art requires that all of these be considered jointly. The quality of 
politics that makes it the "noblest of callings and the vilest of trades" is 
the necessity of balancing demands, relevant and pressing in their 
separate ways, but at times only conditionally converging, at best, and 
at worst, directly contradictory. In the often unforgiving realm of 
foreign affairs, a well-intentioned policy that does not work - that is, 
does not achieve its objectives - is first and foremost, a failed policy. 
Policy therefore cannot be based on moral considerations alone. This 
does not excuse moral laxity, but rather underlines the tragic aspect of 
hard decisions. Conversely, a morally dubious policy may be, as a 
direct consequence, politically vulnerable. 
In the case of 11 September, this mix of morality, legality, politics, 
and military power is captured in the question of how the United 
States - and the world - should respond to international terrorism on 
this scale. Up to this time, acts of international terrorism have largely 
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There is a temptation either to dismiss international law out of 
hand or to assume implicitly that international law functions in the 
same way as our domestic system. Both views are inadequate and 
inaccurate. The first could lead, for example, to a focus on revenge as a 
justification for the Americans, or to apparent suggestions that they 
should stop fighting after some number of Afghan civilians have been 
killed. These are at best perversions of the law. The second fails to 
understand the role of states in the creation and evolution of the law, 
and thus also fails to appreciate why the American position might be 
of broader concern even if it is accepted for this specific case. 
The international political system is a decentralized system, a 
system without a strong, authoritative centre: we do not have a world 
government. International law does not transcend states. In political-
military terms, we have a self-help system, depending on the very states 
that the law wishes to regulate to enforce that law. That may strike some 
as the same as having the inmates in charge of the asylum. We may wish 
it were otherwise, but wishing does not make it so. Thus, while 
international law attempts to regulate and to some degree to constrain 
the actions of states, in so doing it must ultimately appeal to their self-
interest. It must, therefore, also give them the means to pursue what 
they see as their legitimate interests in a way that they judge effective 
and adequate, even as it seeks to shape, channel, and sometimes 
constrain their choices of objectives and their selection of means. 
The United Nations cannot stand in for a world government. It 
also cannot transcend states, but is better seen as an association of 
sovereign states. It faces very substantial limitations on its legal, 
political, and material capabilities, and enjoys only such means and 
such freedom of action as an organization as its members permit it. It 
cannot rise above international politics, though it can play a vital role 
within international politics. Understanding this is crucial to the 
development and the appreciation of any contribution which the 
United Nations, as a collectivity of states, can make to dealing with the 
problem of terrorism. Neither vague invocations of the United Nations 
as a solution, nor grand schemes for United Nations action which 
ignore its limitations, can serve as useful starting-points for a serious 
discussion of policy alternatives. 
Within the international legal system, law arises from many 
sources. Above all, however, the law is what states say it is, whether in 
their practices or in their treaties. The practice of states - both their 
actions and their responses to the actions of others - plays a central 
role. While much of international law is codified into treaties, a 
significant amount is still governed by custom, the body of practices 
which states have come, over time, to accept as legally binding or as 
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legally permissible. Even in the case of treaty law, state practice may 
play a significant role in filling in the details of how specific rules are 
to be understood and applied. In the case of both customary and treaty 
law, if an existing rule is effectively disregarded for a long enough 
time, and frequently enough, and without substantial protest from 
other states, then that rule could fall into disuse or be replaced by 
another. Changes in state practice over time will be reflected in the law. 
Some unsettling conclusions follow from these characteristics. 
Attempts to use international law to stop states - especially powerful 
states - from pursuing what they consider to be their legitimate 
interests by adequate and effective means may not work unless other 
state interests can be successfully invoked. The law will otherwise be 
reshaped. Attempts to constrain states by appeals to excessively artful, 
formalistic, or legalistic interpretations are unlikely to be successful 
when great issues are at stake. Any attempts we make to constrain 
states through law must deal with this. If we want to head off this line 
of development, we must therefore develop other means that render it 
unnecessary, and so offer states other mechanisms that will be 
adequate. Without such machinery and the will to use it, or while 
waiting for its creation, we would be like Canute bidding the tide not 
to come in to ask states to forego their rights - however unwisely they 
might be used in some cases - to defend themselves. Nor could we 
necessarily blame them for being unwilling to let their vital interests 
depend on the kindness and the will of strangers if they have a choice. 
FOUR ISSUES OF SELF-DEFENCE 
Various possible lines of response were open to the United States, 
including dependence on existing laws oriented along criminal 
prosecution of private groups, application of sanctions to Afghanistan, 
and the fielding of a United Nations force in Afghanistan. Instead, the 
United States responded another way, using military action under a 
claim of self-defence. These alternatives to self-defence are not 
considered here.2 They neither preclude nor are precluded by a viable 
self-defence argument. If self-defence is unconvincing, of course, other 
consequences follow. Neither does this essay judge whether the 
American response, if it is within the law, is necessarily the best 
response; that depends on other factors besides legality. 
The claim of self-defence raises a number of issues - some trivial 
or misunderstood, and some with far-reaching implications. The 
lawyers are hard at these.3 Four broad issues are briefly noted here: 
(a) the American invocation of Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations; (b) the question of whether an "armed attack" occurred 
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within the meaning of Article 51; (c) the responsibility of Afghanistan; 
and (d) the limits on American action taken under the heading of self-
defence. Of these, the last two are of particular importance. 
(A) SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 
In a letter to the Security Council dated 7 October 2001, the United 
States invoked Article 51 of the Charter and reported its action against 
Afghanistan as required under that article." Article 51 reads as follows: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defence shall immediately be reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council... to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
As an inherent right, self-defence does not depend on the United 
Nations Charter, though it is limited to some degree within Article 51 
and in broader international law. Nor does it require prior Security 
Council approval, though a resolution affirming it could be politically 
and legally useful. 
The Council could see fit, after the fact, to challenge a claim of 
self-defence, including any specific target of such a claim or elements 
of the response. This seems the only real check on what is otherwise an 
act of judgement by the attacked state; there is no substantial 
authoritative means of regulating self-defence in advance. Without a 
very different United Nations, and thus a very different world in 
which state powers were remarkably limited, states would be unlikely 
to accept anything but their own judgement in this matter of vital 
interest. Given the veto, a Council challenge is effectively impossible 
for the case of the United States, but an otherwise adverse vote would 
be politically telling. The Council could also express approval of the 
American claim. It is not at all clear that it has specifically done so, but 
even after-the-fact approval is not necessary for the right of self-
defence. The community of states, in general terms, does not seem to 
have challenged the American claim, though there is obvious unease in 
some quarters about the nature of the response, its implications, and its 
possible extension beyond Afghanistan. 
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Article 51 permits a state to defend itself from attack until the 
Security Council takes the necessary measures to restore peace and 
security. Once the Security Council does act effectively this seems to 
override self-defence. Security Council resolutions following 11 
September do not fulfill this requirement. 
(B) AN "ARMED ATTACK"? 
Was the United States subject to an armed attack within the meaning of 
Article 51? Though the article does not go into detail, it is not clear that 
it covers non-state attackers. For the sake of argument, it is fair to 
assume that it was written with inter-state, conventional conflicts in 
mind. The nature of the attackers will be noted under point (c). As for 
the means of attack, obviously these were highly unconventional. 
Assuming that other requirements were met, it would be curious to 
give an exemption on the grounds of creativity, especially given the 
scale of the losses. Had the attacks been mounted by identifiable armed 
forces of another state, the unusual means selected would not weigh for 
much in opposition. In any event, this issue is readily overshadowed by 
point (c), the question of attributing responsibility to Afghanistan. 
(C) THE RESPONSIBILITY OF AFGHANISTAN 
International law is, above all, a law between states. Private war, which 
is what al-Qa'ida may essentially have been engaged in, does not fall 
readily into this system - indeed, it has essentially been legally 
removed from the system. Only states may wage war on each other. 
The United States was attacked by a private group, but its response 
was to attack the state of Afghanistan. The American letter to the 
Security Council gave the nub of their position: 
The attacks on September 11, 2001, and the ongoing threat to the 
United States and its nationals posed by the al-Qa'ida 
organization have been made possible by the decision of the 
Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to 
be used by this organization as a base of operation.5 
Taking for granted the attribution of the attack initially to al-Qa'ida, 
how might the responsibility of Afghanistan and its Taliban government 
become engaged? The Taliban regime's status as a government 
unrecognized by most of the world is not a particular issue, since it was 
clearly in control of most of the state territory and thus functioned 
effectively as a government in at least the area under its control. 
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State responsibility for the actions of private groups may arise 
under a variety of circumstances. For example, when Iranian students 
seized the United States embassy in Tehran in 1979, the Iranian state 
became responsible for their actions once it expressed its approval of 
their actions, though the Iranian government was not itself apparently 
behind the seizure. The Taliban regime did not express approval of the 
11 September attacks, but it was associated in some degree with al-
Qa'ida. Is this link sufficient? Ironically, some guidance is available 
from American involvement with the Contras against the government 
of Nicaragua in the 1980s. In the Nicaragua case, the International 
Court of Justice, while noting the United States' role in "financing, 
organizing, training, supplying, and equipping" the Contras, was still 
unwilling to impute full responsibility for their actions within 
Nicaragua to the United States as such, questioning whether they had 
sufficient control on the ground to assign that responsibility.6 
The al-Qa'ida organization existed and operated openly in 
Afghanistan. It appears to have had strong informal ties, at least, to 
the Taliban regime, and to have been a main prop of that regime, 
including on the battlefield against Northern Alliance forces prior to 
11 September. It is not clear that the Taliban as such had a directing or 
controlling influence over al-Qa'ida, but our usual model of well-
organized governments could be inadequate here. The Taliban seem to 
have ruled as one dominating group among many in Afghanistan, 
with al-Qa'ida being one very significant group in the coalition 
supporting it - in the ruling group in effect, though not formally in 
the government.7 This may provide the necessary distinction between 
this case and the Nicaragua case. 
In the 1974 Definition of Aggression, a resolution passed by the 
United Nations General Assembly to help give (non-binding) guidance 
to the Security Council, one illustration of aggressive action was given 
in Article 3(g): 
The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force 
against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts 
listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.8 
Article 3(f) deals with permitting the use of territory. A 
commentary by the Canadian delegation to the United Nations noted 
that a state may not have full knowledge of, or control over, actions on 
its territory, so this factor would have to be considered carefully. 
Regarding Article 3(g), however, the commentary saw this as directly 
related to the problem of terrorism, and suggested that it was a 
movement towards a notion of "indirect aggression." It stated: 
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The acquiescence in or indeed encouragement by one state of 
attacks of armed bands against a second state is rejected by the 
world community in this paragraph. State complicity in acts of 
international terrorism is a problem with which the world 
community has yet to come to grips. This paragraph is an 
encouraging sign of movement in the right direction. ' 
If such actions may be seen as a form of aggression by one state 
against another, the right of self-defence, it would seem, could be 
invoked. The United States and some others have argued a right to 
target states "harboring" terrorist organizations, on the grounds that 
these were accomplices of such organizations, but other states did not 
share this view. This case may point to some movement towards the 
American view. 10This would mark a shifting (to some degree, possibly 
a relaxing) of requirements for attributing the actions of a group to an 
associated state. 
(D) PERMISSIBLE ACTION UNDER SELF-DEFENCE 
Even within the bounds of permissible self-defence, the responding 
state is not unlimited in what it can do. The classic statement of the 
right of self-defence is found in the nineteenth century Caroline case, in 
which United States Secretary of State Daniel Webster argued that the 
state claiming such a justification must show a necessity of self-
defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation. " 
The response must also be proportionate. What actions are 
permissible under these criteria is a matter of debate, in which the 
range of difference is considerable.12 A very narrow reading of these 
requirements restricts self-defence to an on-the-spot application, 
proportionate to the immediate threat, and directed at the immediate 
attackers alone. This, perhaps, is a little too restrictive, to the point of 
potentially nullifying the right in the circumstances we may now face. 
On the other hand, a broadly interpreted right could lead to dispropor-
tionate responses even to isolated incidents, a delayed right of 
response, even perhaps to anticipatory self-defence and a right to 
target a wide range of states. A l l of these lead readily to abuse. 
State practice provides some leeway in how criteria such as those 
in Caroline might be applied. When Argentina invaded the Falkland 
Islands, the British took some weeks to mobilize and position their 
forces before they launched their counterattack, yet the applicability of 
self-defence seems unimpeachable. The American use of force was 
almost one month after 11 September. Bearing in mind the necessity of 
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moving large forces long distances and preparing the diplomatic 
ground, this may not be excessive. Had the United States delayed 
longer, for example, to "give diplomacy a chance," its self-defence 
claim could have diminished. 
As for proportionality, suggesting that rough equivalence in 
casualties and damage is an appropriate criterion risks perverting the 
laws of combat, if it implies a right purposefully to inflict comparable 
civilian casualties. Others suggest that damage could be proportionate 
to meeting a deterrence criterion, or to the purpose of the responding 
attack.13 Full scale attacks or invasions under the claim of self-defence 
are properly a touchy point. Most writers are clearly very 
uncomfortable with any military response that goes beyond that 
needed to repel an attack, and would be unlikely to favour any more 
extensive use of force. Cassese suggests limited circumstances that 
could be applicable here: he argues, as one limit on self-defence, that 
The victim of aggression must not occupy the aggressor State's 
territory, unless this is strictly required by the need to hold the 
aggressor in check and prevent him from continuing the 
aggression by other means.14 
In this case, one could present the American operations as 
militarily similar to clearing a base area for guerrillas, thus destroying 
a sanctuary that facilitated their activities.15 
The Caroline criteria apply most readily where incidents are 
infrequent, small-scale, and local, and where they can be dealt with 
effectively one at a time. A very strict reading of Caroline would reduce 
the United States to largely passive and locally reactive defences, 
giving most of the initiative to its opponent. Given the potential 
resources of modern terrorists, as revealed both on 11 September and 
in the aftermath, this is asking a lot. Further, there is a credible 
argument that 11 September was merely the most recent of a series of 
incidents, including the attack on the USS Cole and the East African 
bombings in which 224 people were killed and almost 5000 were 
injured,16 almost all not American. September 11 could still justify in 
itself a very strong response, other elements being satisfied. However, 
beyond this one event, the United States could argue, or is arguing, a 
pattern or series of events which gives rise to a reasonable expectation 
of further attacks in the future. At this point, these incidents could 
essentially merge into a continuous or on-going armed attack. 
When Israel attacked the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization in Tunis in 1985, the United States abstained on a Security 
Council resolution condemning the attack, but also warned that 
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We ... recognize and strongly support the principle that a state 
subjected to continuing terrorist attacks may respond with 
appropriate use of force to defend against further attacks. This is 
an aspect of the inherent right of self-defense recognized in the 
United Nations Charter.17 
Other states might not accept this interpretation, but this does 
give clear warning of the American reading. The United States also 
presented a self-defence argument for its attack on Libya in 1986, 
vetoing a United Nations Security Council resolution criticizing it. 
(The General Assembly, however, passed a resolution criticizing the 
United States' actions.)18 In the case of the 11 September attack and its 
precursors, the self-defence argument is invoked not against an 
isolated or sporadic incident, but against a series of acts that the 
United States might argue engage the responsibility of the Taliban 
government of Afghanistan. 
THE CANADIAN RESPONSE 
Canadian territory was not attacked on 11 September, although 
Canadians were among the casualties. Canada has associated itself 
with the American military action against al-Qa'ida and the Taliban 
regime, providing armed forces for various combat and related roles 
within Afghanistan and in the region. This implies that, despite some 
possible differences on issues of policy and law, Canada accepts as 
legitimate at least the broad lines of the self-defence argument. 
Under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, collective self-
defence is permitted in response to an armed attack. Representatives of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization responded quickly to events by 
invoking Article 5 of that treaty. This reads in part: 
The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the individual or 
collective right of self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with 
the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the 
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area. 
This article does not commit Canada to any particular response, 
leaving that to our discretion. Whether or not our current form and 
extent of contribution are desirable becomes, if we accept the basic 
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legal case, a question of policy. The mere invocation of Article 5 does 
not in itself definitively answer the basic legal question of whether the 
American action is justified under self-defence. However, as a formal 
expression of the opinion of a number of states in the world, it will 
carry some weight as an indicator of their judgement, as will various 
other statements by individual states and groups of states. 
REPERCUSSIONS 
Within this discussion, at least two sets of concerns might arise even if the 
American response is accepted as legitimate self-defence. These concern, 
first, the application of the argument to different cases, and second, the 
stretching of the acceptable range of the self-defence argument. 
At least some people have attempted to link actions against Iraq 
with actions against terrorism, in general and specifically in the case of 
11 September. There may be independent grounds, both legally and 
politically, for action against Iraq, but that is a different question. 
Arguing a linkage with 11 September, however, would require a clear 
and significant connection between Iraq and those events, sufficient to 
establish state responsibility, or at least clear evidence of a similar, 
impending threat (raising the problem of anticipatory self-defence, at 
best a controversial notion in international law). Other states have 
sought to use the American response to justify their handling of their 
own security problems, as well. However, a narrow view of this would 
seem to require the demonstration of substantial parallels with the 
American situation. Simply to point and say, "there are terrorists, so 
we can do likewise" would be a political argument, not in itself a 
sufficient legal argument. 
Some fear that the American response moves us towards a 
broader reading of self-defence. Possible shifts - a loosening of criteria 
and limits - in the self-defence argument have been noted above, with 
respect to the attribution of responsibility and to the permissible 
response. The shift of responsibility from al-Qa'ida to Afghanistan, and 
the military overthrow of the Taliban regime as a result, may reduce 
some significant constraints on self-defence, in that they allow a looser 
association between a state and a group before state responsibility is 
engaged, and they permit action well beyond what narrower 
interpretations of self-defence would find acceptable. If that is the case, 
there is a danger that lesser events could then lead to more aggressive 
responses. This problem, we should note, could exist quite separately 
from what we might consider appropriate in this particular case. 
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In general, one could note the extreme and provocative events 
that generated the American response, and argue that only 
circumstances of this order could possibly justify a similar reaction. 
The clear potential for abuse is present, however, as other states with 
their own problems with terrorism seek to use these events, politically, 
to justify a harder line. At this point, two considerations intrude. On 
the one hand, even if the legal limits on action soften, political and 
military realities may have a constraining effect. On the other, it may 
be desirable if states which are too closely associated with terrorist 
groups have strong cause to rethink that association. 
However that may be, the series of al-Qa'ida attacks, the apparent 
interest of al-Qa'ida (and possibly other groups) in using very dangerous 
methods of attack, and the nature of the American response point us 
towards a much more troubled and dangerous world. If we are 
concerned with both the action and the reaction - and both must be 
addressed, not simply the latter - then the only medium- and longer-
term alternatives to current lines of action would be precisely to 
strengthen multilateral efforts against terrorism - to dampen down the 
danger, addressing causes as well as symptoms, and to provide viable 
and effective alternatives for states which see themselves as under attack. 
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Ideas about a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) arose in the 
1990s, a time when a "new economy" emerged, information 
technology boomed, and slogans about e-business abounded. This 
context shaped discussions on military policy. That firms should make 
profits was just too old economy, that wars might involve costly battles 
and tough foes seemed too old strategy. E-businesses needed flat 
hierarchies? E-armies should abandon every level of command 
between sensor, shooter, and perhaps, commander. Any management 
system suited to business should fit armies, although Microsoft 
competes on cost and pricing without shooting its rivals. Of course, 
one hesitates to suggest this option to Bill Gates. Again, a failure of 
"just in time" logistics costs firms money, but it costs armies battles. 
The British Army used a similar method to resupply riflemen at 
Isandhlwana in 1878; no customer survived to complain. The recent 
techwreck raises questions about many assumptions in recent military 
debates. Are virtual strategies viable? Like the new economy, will the 
Joint Visions defined by the Pentagon rest on bubbles? Will armed 
forces be transformed into boo.com or Enron? 
Advocates of the RMA assumed that information (as technology 
or superhighway or revolution or age) would transform the know-
ledge available to armed forces, and thus their nature and that of war. 
Joint Visions 2010 and 2020 treated information technology as first 
among equals among the drivers for revolution. Colonel John Warden, 
USAF planner and theorist of airpower, held that "Information will 
become a prominent, if not predominant, part of war to the extent that 
whole wars may well revolve around seizing or manipulating the 
enemy's datasphere." [See the list of principle sources used in the 
Notes segment.] This paper will assess these assumptions and three 
Particulars of First Publication: 
2003. In Airpower in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Ian MacLachlan (Canberra: 
Australian Defence Forces Academy). 
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Stein, wrote, "Information warfare, in its essence, is about ideas and 
epistemology - big words meaning that information warfare is about 
the way humans think and, more important, the way humans make 
decisions ... It is about influencing human beings and the decisions 
they make." Another, Colonel Szafranski, spoke of "targeting 
epistemology."2 The same word means raw data, filtered information, 
processed intelligence, and considered knowledge. Ambiguity has its 
advantages and its dangers. 
Confusion occurs because terminology is both too loose and too 
precise. The civilians and soldiers who originated the concept "IW" 
meant it to indicate something between the poles defined by John 
Arquilla and David Runfeldt: "netwar" (non-state actors using techno-
political means on the Internet to further their objectives, for example, 
by enhancing their propaganda) or "cyberwar" (state sponsored 
hacking against any adversary and defence against the same).3 In 
American doctrine, however, "CNA" or "CNA/E" (Computer Network 
Action/Exploitation) means "cyberwar," while "IW" means a struggle 
by a state in time of war over data, information, and knowledge using 
all methods, ranging from CNA to deception to jamming a radio 
frequency to bombing a headquarters. "IW" is just one form of "IO," 
which can occur in peace and war. The defined applications of IO, 
"command and control warfare" (C2W), in both civil and public affairs, 
fall short of "netwar," but that is partly an artifact of bureaucracy. 
Though civilian agencies and intelligence services conduct many 
functions of IO (for example, black propaganda in peacetime), the 
American literature focuses on those matters controlled by armed 
forces. The Pentagon cannot write doctrine for the CIA, nor is the latter 
likely to be published; one should not forget the context merely because 
it is unspoken. Even more, many extant publications use the terms IW 
and IO in superceded ways, while the USAF defines IO rather as the JCS 
does IW.4 Those problems can be overcome with time and the harmon-
ization of terminology. For convenience sake, I will generally use 
contemporary American terminology but will aim for precision in my 
use of the words data, information, intelligence, and knowledge. 
Faith in knowledge is central to military doctrine. It is expressed 
in formulas like Information Superiority or the Joint Visions which 
guide strategic policy, the concepts of war pursued by each service and 
the overarching idea of NCW (that armed forces will adopt flat 
organisational structures for command, units working in nets on the 
net, sensors linked to shooters, data processing systems at home 
serving as staff for the sharp end through "reachback"). Joint Visions 
2010 and 2020 predict forces with "dominant battlespace awareness," 
possessing better knowledge than, and a "frictional imbalance" and 
"decision superiority" over, an enemy, as well as unprecedented 




Mainstream officials do not go that far in theory, but still approach 
these views in their predictions of practice. Even more: in moving from 
RMA to DBK, war has been conceptualized as game and strategy as 
shooting. The revolutionary literature and Joint Visions alike assume 
that to be seen is to be shot, to be shot is to be killed, and to be fast is to 
win. As Colonel Warden wrote, "a very simple rule for how to go about 
producing the effect: do it very fast - the essence of success in future 
war will certainly be to make everything happen you want to happen in 
a very short period of time - instantly if possible."9 These tendencies are 
reinforced by the routine use of Colonel John Boyd's OODA 
cycle - Observe, Orient, Decide, Act - as the means to conceptualize all 
forms of conflict on all levels of war, with the aim usually defined as 
being to move through the cycle faster than one's opponent. Wiser heads 
urge that this edge be used to think more, rather than simply act faster. 
This model, derived from Boyd's reflections on his experience as a 
fighter pilot in the Korean War, is a good way to conceptualize any form 
of one-on-one combat. It is less useful for war. In a boxing match, speed 
of decision may equal quality of decision; Strategically, cries of "faster! 
harder!" produce premature ejaculation. In contemporary military 
theory, the focus on the OODA cycle, "sensors to shooters," "one shot, 
one k i l l " weapons, and the idea that armed forces can act almost 
without friction on near-perfect knowledge has led to a fetishization of 
speed and the tacticization of strategy. These assumptions are especially 
seductive to airmen, because they reinforce long-standing 
characteristics in the Anglo-American tradition of air warfare: the 
tendencies to generalize about a looming RMA and then to treat one's 
guesses as facts and a future as if it were the present; to confuse the 
process involved in achieving an object for its significance - what Colin 
Gray calls "the world is my dartboard view of aerial strategists ... To the 
air strategist, targeting is strategy";10 to overcentralize C2 and to pursue 
knock-outs through one precise blow against a vital target without 
engaging the enemies' forces. Airmen are great problem solvers, but 
they are prone to view conditions as problems. 
The faith in the military value of knowledge is multiplied by a 
tendency to mistake the rarest achievements of intelligence for its 
norms. In 1995, for example, USAF Chief General Ronald Fogleman 
discussed triumphs like ULTRA and said, "Throughout history, 
soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen have learned one valuable lesson. 
If you can analyze, act and assess faster than your opponent, you will 
win!" - unless, of course, your opponent is stronger or smarter or 
luckier than you.12 Where intelligence once was undervalued, now it is 
oversold, a situation which is also oversimplified. The assumptions are 
that it will be entirely reliable, understood, useful, and usable. One can 
learn exactly what one wants to know when one needs to do so and can 
then verify its accuracy with certainty and speed. The truth and only 
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the truth can be known. It will show what should be done and what 
would be the consequences of so doing. Actions taken on knowledge 
will have the effect one intended - nothing more or less. 
Of course, intelligence is valuable. Often it is a powerful force 
multiplier, rarely does it strike like lightening. It reduces friction and 
uncertainty. It maximizes the efficiency of the use of one's resources, 
while minimizing that of any opponent. Al l of this, however, occurs in 
the context of a balance of intelligence, of a reciprocal struggle between 
actors, where every action shapes all of them in anticipated ways and 
unexpected ones, where two good intelligence services can negate each 
other and gain less than a mediocre bureau might against a bad one. 
Intelligence also has limits. It is marked by frictions, pathologies, and 
uncertainty. The quality of intelligence varies from case to case, and its 
value is unpredictable in advance. No method can always lead to truth 
(which often is useless), nor is intelligence easy to assess. An event may 
have an unambiguous meaning; evidence about it rarely has an 
unambiguous interpretation. Decision-makers are reluctant to change 
their minds, and they tend to interpret bits of information on the basis 
of preconception. Good intelligence may be unusable or it may 
invalidate itself. If one determines another side's intentions and 
forestalls them, one may force it towards unexpected action. 
Intelligence can fail by succeeding. It is as important to know what 
intelligence cannot do as what it can. 
In order to understand these matters, one must embrace 
paradoxes, not dismiss them; they embody the unresolvable dilemmas 
without linear solutions which epitomize the relationship between 
strategy, intelligence, decision-making, and war. Failure to appreciate 
this point cripples the case that NCW and C4ISR will overcome 
uncertainty. They merely will create a new kind - what Michael 
Handel called "Type B uncertainty"- the problem of decision-making 
in a context of too much and too constantly changing information.13 
Uncertainty is not merely about what is seen, but about how we see; 
not just what we know, but how we know that we know what we 
know; because of too few facts - and too many. Uncertainty is a 
condition associated with problems. The problems can be solved, 
though attempts to end one often create another, and probably it is 
impossible to eliminate all of them at any one time; the condition can 
only be endured. One can increase one's certainty and reduce that of an 
adversary or gain a relative advantage over it, and these gains may be 
great, but none of this is easy to achieve. Usually, uncertainty will 
remain sizable. It never can vanish - chess players, knowing their foe's 
dispositions, remain uncertain about their intentions and the clash of 
their own strategies. C4ISR and DBK will increase uncertainty 
precisely through the way they reduce it; so, too, friction. In time of 
112 
JOHN FERRIS 
routine, they will provide more data than a general needs. In time of 
crisis, they will produce less. How far will the ability to collect and 
process information under routine circumstances affect ideas of what 
intelligence can do when it matters? Will such a routine not merely 
hide pathologies and paradoxes and make them even more debilitating 
when they strike? - which will be when it matters. What will a 
machine relying on the receipt of facts in hosts do if deprived of them? 
how will information junkies behave when thrown into cold turkey -
exactly at that moment when battle starts? 
One can reduce these new forms of uncertainty through old-
fashioned means. One must start by dismissing the idealist fallacy 
from strategy and put information and intelligence and knowledge in 
their place. They do not make or execute decisions, people do, and 
more fundamental issues - their education, intuition, doctrine, 
character, courage, openness of mind, wisdom, attitudes towards 
risk - determine how they understand and apply it. Knowledge is only 
as useful as the action it inspires. Decision-makers should listen to 
intelligence and consider whether their perceptions are accurate, 
whether they are pursuing the best means to achieve their ends or 
noting all the salient points; yet they must also remember that 
intelligence cannot answer every question. They cannot wait for the 
last bit of information to be received and for data processing to make 
their decisions. They must know when to act without intelligence or 
knowledge - that is why they are leaders. Soldiers are not 
scholars - they do not need to know everything about something, or 
more and more about less and less. They simply need to know well 
enough so they can act well enough when they must, and they need to 
understand when that moment is - no more, no less. The key questions 
are: What do you need to know? When and how can you know that 
you know enough to act, or know that you know all you can use? 
The answers stem from the training of commanders and the 
techniques of C4I. The Command, Control, Communications, and 
Intelligence Office at the Pentagon defines the aim of information 
superiority as "ensuring that the right people, and only the right 
people, have access to the right information at the right time in the right 
forms."14 That is the correct aim, but it is easier said than done. Many 
records in the public domain indicate it has not yet been achieved. 
Experience in the Kosovo campaign led Air Commodore Stuart Peach 
to sombre conclusions: "The drive to streamline procedures and handle 
ever more data has had an important side effect; airmen have become 
driven by process not strategy,"; "In reality, theory, doctrine and 
practice collide with process. Airmen claim one thing (centralized 
command and decentralized execution) and in fact practice another 
(centralized command and centralized execution)"; and "Refining the 
process of airspace control orders, air tasking orders and air task 
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messages became the performance criteria, rather than creative and 
bold operational ideas or campaign plans."15 The USN's "Global 2000" 
war games tested the application of NCW. It found both the power of 
C3I and its classic problems multiplied; for example, with every 
member of the net able to post notes and edit orders and reports, 
information overload paralyzed command - officers had so much data 
that they could use little of it, and bad coin drove out good. One 
witness questioned the validity of "visions of a command-and-control 
structure akin to the civilian internet... that the natural creativity, 
spontaneity, and adaptability of war fighters can be unleashed by 
freedom from constraint analogous to that of the civilian Internet in 
commercial settings."16 A l l shades of opinion recognize that the move 
toward C4ISR has magnified problems such as information overload, 
micromanagement, and the fruitless search for certainty, for which they 
share many proposed solutions (changing the culture of command 
being but one). Nonetheless, major differences have emerged between 
revolutionaries and others, between those who see only problems and 
those who also see conditions. The USMCs draft doctrine on IO 
denounces the idea that technology can solve all problems and 
emphasizes the need to retain "our timeless fighting principles"; Army 
doctrine shares this view.17 Enthusiasts, conversely, perceive solutions 
through revolutionary changes to command, such as war like Nintendo 
or by swarms. Either commanders will have instantaneous and 
simultaneous control over all of their pieces, or units will operate with 
complete independence while still achieving a harmony of the whole.18 
One revolutionary theorist, Thomas K. Adams, notes that 
our endless quest for certainty is creating an "information 
pathology" ... Increasing complexity has led to increasing 
specialization that has led to increasing demands for information 
at all levels. This spawns new organizations and expands old 
ones to satisfy the demand for information, which in turn creates 
still more demand which in turn creates more complexity and so 
on. This cycle quickly becomes debilitating and [leads], at best, to 
severe information congestion and overload. 
He concludes, "Future generations may come to regard tactical 
warfare as properly the business of machines and not appropriate for 
people at all."19 Instead, only digital, automatic, nonhuman, and inhuman 
means can allow a true C4I and NCW and S2S system to work. 
The conditions of command for humans cannot be solved, but the 
problems may be. Technology can transform some matters, for good 
and i l l . Between 1898 and 1945, radio enabled a revolution in command 
and also created a new source of intelligence and insecurity. Efforts to 
deal with jamming, interception, and physical attack reduced the 
theoretical efficiency of the military use of radio by perhaps 90 per cent. 
In recent years, communication technology may have reduced these 
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problems but multiplied those of information overload, just as 
computers increase one's ability to process data while swamping one in 
it. Meanwhile, institutional solutions can turn some problems of 
intelligence into those of information processing, and of strategy into 
tactics. From 1912 to 1945, battleships had data processing displays 
which represented the adjacent battlespace with power and in real 
time, as have fighter aircraft since 1975, though during those years, the 
space represented expanded from two dimensions to three and in 
diameter from ten to five-hundred miles. Strategic air defence systems 
and general staffs allowed military institutions to handle extraordinary 
problems of collection, analysis, and action with great efficiency. Even 
in 1918, British air defence was able to collect and correlate reports on 
enemy air raids from thousands of sources over a 2,500 square mile area 
and convert them into an accurate and real-time picture for its 
commander within 90 seconds, and then to launch fighters to act on this 
information within another 90.20 In order to create a fluid but hardened 
information and command system under present circumstances, one 
must determine how C4I will function and how each level or unit will 
interact when at work in war. This will determine how far armed forces 
can fight in nets on the net and how flat or fat their hierarchy can be. 
Possibly one or another layer of command may safely be eliminated; 
certainly, forms of middle management and hierarchy will still be 
needed to let units fight effectively when under attack. Then one can 
devise organizational short cuts, such as "push" or "pull" techniques to 
distribute information to units, or "directed telescopes" to let 
commanders learn with immediacy and effect about whatever matters 
concern them, or drills to link sensor and shooter. The aims must be to 
simplify the flood of data and direct it where needed, thus avoiding the 
classic problem with satellite imagery, when one knew what to look for 
only after the start of the crisis when that knowledge was needed. It 
will be hard to gain full access to data about known unknowns and 
impossible about most unknown unknowns. Nor can any such systems 
be effective unless doctrine and training prepares people to use it. Units 
must be able to operate in harmony without command, through some 
new version of "marching to the sound of the guns." Commanders 
must learn to act when they have a good enough picture of events, even 
when it clearly is imperfect and new information is constantly arriving, 
and to understand when they have achieved that condition. Sometimes 
this process is called "to opticize"; Clausewitz termed a similar process 
the "imperative principle."21 When combined, these means have power 
and limits. They can solve many problems of command, perhaps most 
of them, but not all, and conditions will remain. C4ISR will be a 
function of a complex system manned by many people. It will suffer 
from all of the things natural to humans and complex systems, 
including uncertainty and friction, unachieved intentions, unintended 
consequences, and unexpected failures and successes. 
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If so, how likely are the claims for DBK and NCW to be realized 
by 2020? They can most easily be fostered for diplomacy and strategy 
in peace - too easily. This, alas, will reinforce attempts by figures at 
home to control all tactical details abroad - increasing friction, 
micromanagement, and information overload - as politicians become 
entangled with their privates. In war, DBK and NCW may work as 
hoped, but only when one belligerent absolutely outclasses its 
adversary. They probably cannot function in a serious clash between 
peer competitors, because each would simultaneously attack the 
other's ability to fight at this level, forcing both into the classic 
downward spiral which degrades the power of C3I. For the strategic 
level in war, the case is uncertain but important: how will generals act 
when they can command any, but not every, individual soldier? or 
soldiers when they can seize the prerogatives of command? or armed 
forces when all these things happen simultaneously? Again, without 
middle management, armed forces have no operational need for 
officers between major and brigadier. What would this do to career 
structures? how will captains learn to be generals? For this reason, the 
officers of elite forces question NCW. At the operational level, DBK and 
NCW will work far less well for armies than for air forces and navies, 
which over past generations often have used a C3I system structurally 
similar to that assumed by NCW, if the shooting platform, warship or 
aircraft, is treated as the unit, rather than the individual members of a 
cruiser, fighter base, or infantry battalion. Some forms of 
platformcentric warfare also were netcentric. NCW may work well 
against some conventional enemies, perhaps many of them, and the 
ability to deter or defeat such a source of challenge is a major 
advantage, but it has its limits. NCW and DBK will always be 
vulnerable to any technologically competent foe. GPS was essential to 
the left hook which flattened the Iraqi army, and such channels are 
easily jammed; what if this had occurred in 1991? NCW will be 
irrelevant in irregular warfare, including struggles against terrorists. If 
NCW fails in any instance on which it is relied, disaster will be 
redoubled precisely because of that fact; and fail NCW must, sooner or 
later. If successful, it will force one's adversaries to find solutions by 
evading your strength or by making you play to your weaknesses. It is 
always convenient when one's enemy chooses to be foolish or weak, or 
foolish and weak, but sometimes it does not choose to be, and you will 
be a fool to assume it must be one. A smart but weak foe may simply 
refuse to play any game where you can apply your strengths, and 
make you play another one, such as terrorism. A tough and able foe 
might turn the characteristics of your game and machine into a 
strength of its own, by attacking any precondition for DBK and NCW 
and then by imposing its rules on you. By doing what suits them in the 
context of our power, they will change their strengths and 
weaknesses - and yours, too. 
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Compared to C4ISR and NCW, IO is a less novel and less 
problematical concept. IO is a new term, perhaps adopted because IW 
had already acquired conflicting meanings. It embraces many 
"disciplines" - deception, operational security, electronic warfare (EW), 
and psychological operations. With the significant exception of CNA, 
however, IO does not involve pouring old wine into new bottles, merely 
placing new labels on old bottles. Functions which intelligence officers 
once might have conducted in a general staff (perhaps with operations, 
security, and signals personnel in secondary roles) are now treated as a 
combat arm, controlled by the senior operations officer, with 
intelligence personnel first among equals of specialist elements. This 
rise of Operations and decline of Intelligence is marginal and 
reasonable; IO are operational matters, but they need a close 
relationship with intelligence and other elements. The basic doctrine for 
IO is sound, and it is close to the best practices of the best practitioners 
of two world wars. IO should be controlled by an officer directly 
responsible to a commander, guided by a small "cell" of specialists able 
to provide expertise and liaison; the various "disciplines" of IO should 
be "fused"; not merely coordinated, but combined.22 
American doctrine on deception, for example, rests on intelligent 
consideration of the analyses of the best practitioners and scholars. It 
defines all aspects of intelligence as force multipliers to be integrated 
into every aspect of planning and operations. Intelligence, 
psychological warfare, and operations security have a dynamic 
relationship with deception, the attempt to "deliberately mislead 
adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, 
intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take 
specific actions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the 
friendly mission." This doctrine for deception defines sound 
principles: "centralized control" and "security"; "timeliness" in 
planning and execution; "integration" of deceit with an operation; and 
above all, "focus" and "objective," aiming to influence the right 
decision-makers and to affect their actions - to treat the manipulation 
of intelligence and ideas merely as means to an end. In order to achieve 
these ends, practitioners must understand their foe's psychology, 
"possess fertile imaginations and the ability to be creative while using 
and understanding each component of deception and C2W 
capabilities." They must pass a story through many sources which an 
adversary will find believable, ideally by reinforcing its expectations. 
This doctrine is powerful, but it has weaknesses which stem from the 
roots of its strength, the influence of the British tradition of deception, 
reflected through the campaigns of 1943-44 and culminating in 
FORTITUDE, the cover for the invasion of Normandy. The latter stems 
from so many unique circumstances that it is a poor guide to the 
average. To treat it as normal is to assume that deception is precise and 
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predictable, that one will have edges equivalent to ULTRA and the 
"double cross system," while the enemy's intelligence is castrated. 
These are tall assumptions. Again, "focus" and "objective" are fine 
principles, but in order to make key decision-makers act as one wishes, 
one must know who they are, what they expect, how to reach them, 
and how to know whether one has succeeded. This is not easy. 
Deceivers wrestle with uncertainties and pull strings they hope are 
attached to levers in a complex system they do not understand. 
Deception rarely has just the effect one wants and no other. The 
unintended cannot be avoided. American doctrine urges that this 
difficulty and others be resolved through risk assessment, but that is to 
mistake a condition for a problem. Reason is good, war games are fun; 
when assessment concludes, risks remain. Never when one deceives 
will one know all the unintended consequences in advance. Rarely will 
one know if deception has worked when one must act.23 
What can one expect from IO? They have a proven track record. 
During the First World War, psychological operations achieved 
remarkable successes, as did deception and operational security in 
1917-18, though EW remained primitive. IO had even greater effect in 
the Second World War. Perhaps the greatest change was in deception, 
which was applied to more and greater matters - to cover German and 
Japanese surprise attacks in 1941 and to mislead Germany about the 
capabilities and intentions of every ally between 1942-45; meanwhile, 
EW became mature. During the Cold War, these matters were practiced 
constantly and often with significance, though the full story no doubt 
has not been told. IO are powerful tools, but they do not necessarily 
work as one hopes, and they can also be used by one's adversary. 
Defence matters as much as attack; it simply is harder. Their power will 
be multiplied in an unpredictable way by the rise of a new discipline. 
Unclassified material rarely refers to CNA, but the topic has not been 
ignored, simply treated with secrecy, just as armies did deception and 
signals intelligence between 1919-39. One USAF intelligence officer 
notes the following: "offensive IO weapons ... remain shrouded in 
limited-access programs"; the JCS's doctrine on IO discusses CNA in a 
classified annex; in 2000-01, the USAF sponsored research into 
specialist "Cyber-Warfare Forces," "potential targeting issues," and 
"how to mitigate or minimize collateral damage effects," how CNA 
would affect "the full-spectrum of Information Attacks" and create new 
"broadly defined multi-disciplinary activities, such as: cyber-based 
deception, Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI), Web Security, 
Perception Management. How do we integrate/fuse input and provide 
a COA (Course of Action)?"24 The Pentagon's Command and Control 
Research Program describes CNA as, "a rapidly evolving field of study 
with its own concepts and technology." 25 Sooner or later, some state 
118 
JOHN FERRIS 
will let slip the bytes of cyberwar with uncertain effect. CNA may 
revolutionize IO by incapacitating computer systems or by replacing 
true data with false, or it may prove Y2K revisited. So too, the nature of 
power in CNA is unknown: "How do you measure IO power?" asks the 
USAF's Institute for National Security Studies; "How would one 
calculate Correlation of Forces â la past Soviet/Russian approaches?"; 
"What are the 'units of IW force' or their structure, e.g., squadrons of 
IW computers?"26 
The literature on IW and IO has been Americentric, focusing on 
how the United States should exploit the information revolution. In 
fact, IW may multiply the power of other states more than that of the 
United States, which might not be a hyperpower in this area. It has the 
greatest potential ability to conduct cyberwar, but this position has 
been sapped by the NSA's feud with the American computing 
community, its greater power in and reliance on computers increases 
the United State's vulnerability to cyberwar, while anyone can exploit 
for free the massive American investment in the Internet. Anyone able 
to employ a hacker for love or money can hope to gain from cyberwar, 
while attack somewhere is easier than defence everywhere. The entry 
costs for cyberwar are small, the potential payoff large, and the 
consequences uncertain. Defence of vital sites and recovery from 
onslaught may prove easy. Cyberwar may be treated as a weapon of 
mass destruction and never used for attack, though adding a new twist 
to deterrence. A first strike in IW may be so advantageous that it creates 
an imperative to move first. If CNA proves significant, that fact alone 
may raise the average of IO to its top level of the twentieth century. 
Despite its power, the idea of IO has its problems. In American 
doctrine, its main role is to support C2W, perhaps the main form of 
conventional operations that the United States plans to fight and one 
which targets epistemology. The aim is "to deny information to, 
influence, degrade, or destroy" the "information dependent process, 
whether human or automated" of enemy C2 by attacking "all the 
capabilities, thought processes, and actions that allow a commander to 
correctly observe the AOI; assess what these observations imply about 
the operation; use assessments to make timely, effective decisions; and 
communicate these decisions as orders to subordinate commanders in 
order to control the course of an operation"; "causing hesitation, 
confusion, and misdirection among adversary commanders 
contributes to slowing the adversary's operational tempo."27 C2W is an 
effective way to conceptualize conventional warfare and to bring 
intelligence and IO to battle. This end is worth pursuing but it is not 
easy to reach. In order to do so, an armed force requires relative 
superiority in it and a high, absolute level of intelligence and IO; while 
the latter have an excellent track record in attritional struggles, they 
matter less to them than to mind games. One can win 
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decisively in attritional or maneouvre warfare without first doing so in 
intelligence or IO; a draw in intelligence precludes victory in C2W. 
This idea also suffers from flaws like those of C4ISR and NCW. It 
overstates the significance of intelligence and knowledge in battle. It 
assumes one can always play to one's strengths and ignore one's 
weaknesses and impose one's will on an enemy and stamp one's rules 
on war. Drawing from Sun Tzu, Basil Liddell Hart, J.F.C. Fuller, Guilio 
Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and colonels Boyd and Warden, C2W rests 
on the assumption one can shatter an enemy's will or command or key 
nodes of power while evading its strength, whether that is used on the 
defence or the attack. Sometimes such ends can be achieved, but not 
always, nor often. C2W can succeed when one has a great edge over 
one's enemy in IO, C4ISR, and power, and when precise attacks against 
key nodes are possible. When both sides are closely matched or the 
enemy is strong and tough, then combat of a more conventional kind 
will occur; attrition is a natural form of warfare - perish the thought. 
The doctrine of C2W does not discuss these possibilities. Indeed, it 
masks their existence, because its definition includes physical attack on 
the enemy, through which means C2W may easily turn into more 
conventional combat. So long as those planning for C2W appreciate 
how easily it can be transformed and prepare for such an event, 
however, they can gain from the effort. Even if C2W fails to work 
entirely as planned, partial success will bolster one's position in other 
forms of conventional combat for which IO and intelligence will be 
valuable. The watchword for war in 2020 should be: Play mind games; 
Prepare for body blows. 
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